Hard Cap or Soft Cap:  The Optimal Player Mobility Restrictions for the Professional Sports Leagues by Levine, Alan M.
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law 
Journal 
Volume 6 Volume VI 
Number 1 Volume VI Book 1 Article 5 
1995 
Hard Cap or Soft Cap: The Optimal Player Mobility Restrictions for 
the Professional Sports Leagues 
Alan M. Levine 
J.D. Candidate, 1996, Fordham University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj 
 Part of the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Alan M. Levine, Hard Cap or Soft Cap: The Optimal Player Mobility Restrictions for the Professional Sports 
Leagues, 6 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 243 (1995). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol6/iss1/5 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal 
by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, 
please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
Hard Cap or Soft Cap: The Optimal Player Mobility Restrictions for the 
Professional Sports Leagues 
Cover Page Footnote 
This Note is dedicated to my family and friends for their support and encouragement. I am also grateful 
to those who helped me throughout the editing process, in particular Judd Kleeger, for their comments 
and suggestions. 
This note is available in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal: 
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol6/iss1/5 
Hard Cap or Soft Cap: The Optimal
Player Mobility Restrictions for the
Professional Sports Leagues
Alan M. Levine*
For team owners, agents and athletes, balancing economic
sense with sports sense and loyalty is the great challenge of
the 90's. The mission has become a breathtaking, heart-
breaking process of trial and error.1
INTRODUCTION
Gone are the days of the true sports hero. Whereas athletes
previously played sports purely for the love of the game, today's
major league professional team sport2 athletes seem to be merely
hired guns. 3  Recently, these athletes, through their players' as-
sociations, have become more vociferous about maximizing salaries
* J.D. Candidate, 1996, Fordham University School of Law. This Note is dedicated
to my family and friends for their support and encouragement. I am also grateful to those
who helped me throughout the editing process, in particular Judd Kleeger, for their com-
ments and suggestions.
1. William C. Rhoden, Loyalty Issue Crystallizes On Mattingly, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
18, 1995, at 29.
2. This Note discusses the players' relationship vis-h-vis league management regard-
ing employment terms in American football and basketball. This author assumes that the
principles discussed in this Note will also relate to American baseball and hockey. Cf.
Paul D. Staudohar & James A. Mangan, Introduction to THE BUSINESS OF PROFESSIONAL
SPORTS 1, 2 (Paul D. Staudohar & James A. Mangan eds., University of Illinois 1991).
This Note will also relate to one newcomer, soccer, see New Pro League Will Debut in
April, ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, Oct. 18, 1995, at D3. Announced in October 1995,
Major League Soccer ("MLS") will begin its inaugural season on April 6, 1996, with
teams in ten cities. Id. Also, it should be noted that American-style free agency will be
exported to European soccer based on a recent European Court of Justice decision.
Christopher Clarey, Free Agency Crosses the Atlantic, Anxiety on Board, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 20, 1995, at B21.
3. For a complete discussion on the change in nature of the professional athlete and
the sports business, see Robert Lipsyte, The Emasculation Of Sports, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
Apr. 2, 1995, at 50.
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and freedoms, and team owners, perpetually willing to fight over
revenues, have only exacerbated the conflict. These skirmishes
have resulted in many work stoppages, making the negotiations
between the players' associations and the professional leagues, at
times, the only sport to watch.
Historically, the owners contained players' salaries through
various player mobility restrictions.4 The owners' initial method
of restraining player movement and preventing intra-league bidding
wars over players was through a device called the reserve clause.5
This device gave a team the exclusive right to a player's services
and allowed a team to offer any salary to the player.6 The reserve
clause forced a player to accept the contract or lose his eligibility
to play the sport.7 Players were indoctrinated into the reserve sys-
tem through another mobility restriction, which still exists, called
the college draft.' The college draft is a system by which college
players are selected by teams and placed on their reserve lists. 9
Another type of mobility restriction is the right of first refusal,
which operates in conjunction with free agency restrictions to limit
player mobility before a player plays a specified number of years.1°
When a player has not met the threshold years, upon expiration of
his contract, the player becomes a restricted free agent and subject
to the prior team's right of first refusal." The right of first refusal
allows a team to match any offer from another team made to its
player 2 in order to keep the player. Once reaching the required
number of years the player obtains the status of an unrestricted free
agent. At this stage, the player is permitted to sign with any team
4. See Roger G. Noll, The Economics of Sports Leagues, reprinted in LAW OF PRO-
FESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS § 17.03[4], at 17-20 to 17-28 (Gary A. Uberstine ed.
1988). Evidence demonstrates that the player mobility restrictions limit player's salaries
to approximately one half their value in a free marketplace. Id.
5. See infra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing the reserve clause).
6. See infra note 57.
7. See infra note 57.
8. See infra note 57 (discussing the college draft).
9. See infra note 57.
10. See infra note 85 (discussing the right of first refusal).
11. See infra note 85 (discussing restricted free agency).




As a number of these player mobility restrictions failed under
increasing antitrust scrutiny and player demands, the leagues de-
vised new methods to restrict player mobility. 4 The salary cap is
one such method. 15 The salary cap enables players to move more
freely intra-league, but subtly limits the number of teams a player
can negotiate with. 16 The reduction in the number of teams occurs
because the salary cap proscribes maximum team amounts that can
be paid to players. 7 The difference between actual salary paid to
a team's current players and the team's applicable salary cap is the
amount that a team can use to acquire other players.1 8  Conse-
quently, this system creates incentives for players to negotiate only
with teams who have acceptable amounts (to the players) available
under their ceiling.
Today, there are two types of salary cap in existence. The
first type of salary cap, the hard cap, is employed by the National
Football League ("NFL"). The hard cap sets a specific limit on the
amounta team may pay its players, and teams may not exceed this
amount under any circumstances.' 9 The second type of salary cap,
the soft cap, is used by the National Basketball Association
("NBA"). This cap sets a maximum amount, like the NFL cap, but
13. See infra note 85 (discussing unrestricted free agency).
14. See discussion infra parts I.A, I.B (discussing the NFL and NBA player mobility
restriction methods).
15. The salary cap is a salary limitation by which leagues set ceilings on the amount
teams can pay players. Depending on the type of cap instituted, there may or may not
be exclusions from its calculation for certain transactions. See discussion infra part II.A.4
(discussing NFL veteran salary restrictions); part II.B.4 (discussing NBA veteran salary
restrictions). Another type of salary restriction is the tax system, which places a sur-
charge on amounts teams spend over a certain limit. See infra note 294 (discussing tax
systems). However, no professional league, at the time of this writing, has adopted this
method.
16. See discussion infra parts III.A.4, III.B.4 (discussing the NFL and NBA salary
caps).
17. See infra notes 202-08 and accompanying text (discussing the NFL salary cap);
notes 232-49 and accompanying text (discussing the NBA salary cap).
18. See infra notes 202-08 and accompanying text (discussing the NFL salary cap);
notes 232-49 and accompanying text (discussing the NBA salary cap).
19. See discussion infra part II.A.4.
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allows its teams to exceed the cap in specific situations.20
Recently, the struggle by the players' associations to prevent
the imposition of, and free themselves from, these mobility restric-
tions has intensified. Events occurring within Major League Base-
ball ("Baseball") represent perhaps the most acerbic struggle be-
tween players and management to prevent the imposition of the
salary restrictions. On August 12, 1994, the Major League Base-
ball Players' Association ("MLBPA") went on strike.2' The players
took action fearing that the owners would unilaterally impose a cap
on players salaries when the 1990-1993 Basic Agreement2 2 ex-
pired. 23  Concerned by the bitterness of the strike, politicians at-
tempted to resolve the conflict, but to no avail. 24 With only days
20. See discussion infra part II.B.4.
21. Baseball Accepts Mediation, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 13, 1994, at Al. In the eighteen
year period between 1972 and 1990, there were seven work stoppages. J. Jordan Lippner,
Note, Replacement Players For The Toronto Blue Jays?: Striking The Appropriate Bal-
ance Between Replacement Worker Law In Ontario, Canada And The United States, 18
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 2026, 2030 (1995).
22. Basic Agreement between The American League of Professional Baseball Clubs
and The National League of Professional Baseball Clubs and Major League Baseball
Players Association, effective Jan. 1, 1990 (on file with the Fordham Intellectual Property,
Media & Entertainment Law Journal) [hereinafter Baseball Agreement]. The Baseball
Agreement, which expired at the end of 1993, see id. art. XXIII, at 61, provided for
minimum salaries, id. art. VI.B, at 9; a World Series'and League Championship Players'
Pool, id. art. X, at 24; Grievance Procedures pertaining to salaries or disciplinary action,
id. art. XI, at 25; and the Reserve System, id. art. XX, at 48. In the Agreement, Baseball
had neither limits on the maximum a player could be paid nor provisions regarding
revenue sharing. See id.
23. Murray Chass, Owners Scrap Salary Cap to Create a Ray of Hope, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 4, 1995, at 27. Ultimately, the owners unilaterally imposed the salary cap anyway,
Baseball Cap Not An Ideai Fit For Many, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 24, 1994, at Bi, and
further examined the use of replacement players at the end of 1994. Bracing For A
World of Replacements, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Dec. 26, 1994, at C12.
24. After gaining majority control of Congress in early 1995, the Republicans intro-
duced legislation ranging from a complete repeal of Baseball's antitrust exemption, to a
requirement that the parties submit to binding arbitration. S. 15, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995); H.R. 45, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R. 397, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995);
see also Murray Chass, Lawmakers Pursue 'Contract With Fans', N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5,
1995, at B13 [hereinafter Chass, Lawmakers Pursue 'Contract With Fans']; H.R. 120,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R. 106, 104th Corig., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R. 365, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R. 386, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); see infra note 60 (dis-
cussing Baseball's antitrust exemption). The introduction of these bills, however, did not
[Vol. 6:243
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remaining until the start of 1995-96 season, and replacement play-
ers in training camp,25  Federal District Court Judge Sotomayor
issued an injunction reinstating the terms of the expired Basic
Agreement.26 While this injunction saved the 1995 season, it pro-
vided only a temporary solution." To date there is still no new
collective bargaining agreement and no long term labor peace.28
provide sufficient incentive for the owners to settle the strike. Today, these bills are
stalled in'committee.
However, even if Congress does repeal Baseball's antitrust exemption, the players
may not be free from Baseball's mobility restrictions. Lewis Kurlantzick, Baseball's
Antitrust Exemption And Labor Relations, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 19, 1994, at 1. The non-statuto-
ry labor exemption from the antitrust laws, see infra note 67, would likely protect the
Baseball owners from antitrust litigation since the resulting negotiating landscape would
focus on the effects of non-statutory exemption once an agreement expired. Dominic
Bencivenga, Baseball's Next Game, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 12, 1995, at 5; see infra notes 94-103,
146-48 and accompanying text (discussing status of non-statutory exemption once a
collective bargaining agreement expires).
In February 1994, after his administration's top mediator, William Usury, failed to
produce results, President Clinton attempted but ultimately failed to end the strike through
arbitration. Murray Chass, Everybody Is Shut Out At White House Talks, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb, 7, 1995, at Bl 1 [hereinafter Chass, Everybody Is Shut Out]. The National Labor
Relations Board ("NLRB"), which investigates charges of unfair labor practices, then
stepped in to facilitate Baseball's stalled negotiations by influencing the owners to eiimi-
nate the self-imposed salary cap. NLRB v. Major League Baseball Player Relations
Comm., Inc., N.Y. L.J., Apr. 5, 1995, at 25 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 1995); see also Chass,
supra note 23. Specifically, the NLRB threatened the owners with the issuance of an
unfair labor practice complaint which would interfere with the owners' plan to use re-
placement players. Id. This threat, which successfully caused the owners to remove the
salary cap, was significant because, under the antitrust laws, employers can legally replace
workers when protecting their legitimate business interests and do not have to re-hire the
striking workers once the strike ends. See NLRB v. International Van Lines, 409 U.S.
48 (1972). The right of an employer to replace striking workers, however, does not
extend to a strike in protest of an employer's unfair labor practices. NLRB v. Mackey
Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
25. See generally David Ferrell, The Boys of Spring Strike Out Far From the Hoopla
of Opening Day, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1995, at Al; Wayne Lockwood, Replacements?
Padres Finally Are The Real Deal, SAN DIEGO UNION & TRIB., Apr. 12, 1995, at D1;
Players Gladly Return to Their Day Jobs, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Apr. 4, 1995, at D3.
26. Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player Relations Comm., 880 F. Supp. 246
(S.D.N.Y. 1995), aft'd, 67 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Dave Anderson, There's No
Winner, Only A Big Loser, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1995, at Cl.
27. Anderson, supra note 26.
28. Id.; see also Murray Chass, Players and Clubs Still Need A Pact, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 5, 1995, at B9; John Helyar, Owners Vote To Play Ball On April 26, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 3, 1995, at A2.
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The National Hockey League ("NHL") also had its share of
labor strife. In September 1994, instead of a players' strike, the
NHL owners locked out their players because the NHL and the
National Hockey League Players' Association ("NHLPA") dis-
agreed over the terms of a new collective bargaining agreement.29
Fearing that players' salaries were becoming unaffordable, the
owners bargained for imposing player salary restraints in the form
of a tax system.3 ° The NHLPA, concerned about the effect this and
other restraints would have on both players' salaries, and on their
ability to garner free market wages, did not consent to these salary
restrictions.31 After a 103 day lockout period, however, the NHL
and NHLPA finalized a new collective bargaining agreement.32
Even the NBA, normally free from labor disputes,33 experienced
labor problems in 1994-95. The turbulence was due to the desire
of the National Basketball Players' Association ("NBPA") to elimi-
nate the league's 12-year-old salary cap when the then-existing
agreement expired in September of 1994. 31 Other points of conten-
tion included the college draft and free agency restrictions. 35 The
owners, in contrast, called for stricter salary limitations, the elimi-
29. See Joe LaPointe, Lock Up the Zamboni, N.H.L. Season Is on Hold, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 30, 1994, at B9. I
30. NHL Statement, Oct. 11, 1994, at 1-3 (on file with the Fordham Intellectual
Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal). This tax -system would have allowed
teams to pay players unrestricted salaries, but teams would have to pay a tax for aggre-
gate team salaries over a specified limit. Id. Like the salary cap, the intended purpose
of the tax system would be to restrain players' salaries. Id.
31. -Joe LaPointe, Pact Reached For Salvaging Hockey Season, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12,
1995, at A .
32. Id. The new agreement provided no salary restrictions on veteran salaries,
however, it did institute limitations on rookie compensation. id. Further, modifications
to the expired agreement were made regarding arbitration awards and free agency restric-
tions. Id.
33. Glen St. Louis, Keeping the Playing Field Level: The Implications, Effects and
Application of the Nonstatutory Labor Exemption on the 1994 National Basketball Associ-
ation Collective Bargaining Process, 1993 DET. C.L. REV. 1221, 1249.
34. Clifton Brown, There's No Stoppage In Sight, But The N.B.A. Is Very Much In
The Labor-Woes Lineup, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1994, at B12; Murray Chass, The Seman-
tics Game May Be The Only Game In Town, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1994, at B18.
35. Brown, supra note 34.
[Vol. 6:243
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nation of one-year clauses and balloon payments,36 and rookie sala-
ry limits. 37  Before tempers flared, however, the parties agreed on
a "no lockout, no strike" policy which saved the 1994-1995 season,
while the two sides negotiated a-new agreement.38
The only league absent from the 1994-95 labor disputes was the
NFL, but because a new agreement 39 negotiated in 1993, ended
years of litigation between the NFL and the National Football
League Players' Association ("NFLPA").4° While this agreement
resolved the labor-management conflict over the mobility restric-
tions for the term of the agreement, the owners are already seeking
to circumvent its restrictive covenants.4'
36. These are methods of salary cap circumvention. See infra notes 348-53 and
accompanying text (discussing cap circumvention methods).
37. Brown, supra note 34.
38. Murray Chass, N.B.A. and Players Agree to Play Ball This Season, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 28, 1994, at B7 [hereinafter Chass, N.B.A. and Players Agree]. A number of high
profile players, including Patrick Ewing and Michael Jordan sued the league, claiming
antitrust violations based on the salary provisions in the expired collective bargaining
agreement. Murray Chass, N.B.A. Faces Antitrust Suit By Its Players, N.Y. TIMES, June
29, 1995, at B9 [hereinafter Chass, N.B.A. Faces Antitrust Suit]. Usually, a court would
dismiss the case, like in National Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, 857 F. Supp. 1069, 1071-
72 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff'd, 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3070
(U.S. July 24, 1995) (holding that an expired collective bargaining agreement's provisions
continued to be exempt from antitrust scrutiny until the collective bargaining relationship
ended). However, these players sought to decertify the union, making the exemption
unavailable under the holding of Powell v. National Football League, 678 F. Supp. 777
(D. Minn. 1988), rev'd, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040
(1991). Cf. Murray Chass, N.B.A. and Union in Agreement at Midnight Hour, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 9, 1995, at B7 [hereinafter Chass, N.B.A. and Union].
Days before the union vote, however, the NBA and NBPA agreed to a new collective
bargaining agreement which included an increase in the salary cap, a recalculation of
revenues, and a rookie salary cap. Chass, N.B.A. and Union, supra; see also discussion
infra part II (discussing the basic tenets of the new NBA agreement). When the vote was
taken, a majority of the players voted against decertifying the union and for playing bas-
ketball in 1995-96. See Murray Chass, N.B.A. Players Support Union By a Landslide,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1995, at B9 [hereinafter Chass, N.B.A. Players Support Union].
39. See discussion infra part II.A (discussing 1993 NFL Agreement).
40. See discussion infra part L.A (discussing bargaining history between the NFL &
NFLPA); infra part III.C (discussing methods of cap circumvention under the NFL salary
cap).
41. See Timothy W. Smith, Sanders Agrees to Dallas's Rich Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
10, 1995, SundaySports, at 7; Richard Sandomir, Now Jones Must Prove How Smart Nike
Deal Is, Sept. 7, 1995, at B23; supra notes 357-66, 388-91"and accompanying text (dis-
1995]
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With the NFLPA and NBPA consenting to salary and other
restrictions, and the MLBPA and NHLPA resisting the imposition
of new mobility limitations, professional sports teeters on the verge
of continual work stoppages while the parties struggle over the
form of these mobility restrictions. This Note argues that the opti-
mal system of mobility restrictions, regardless of the sport, is based
on a model of the NBA's soft salary cap. This method provides
for the maximization of players' salaries while maintaining the
fiscal integrity of a league. Part I presents the collective bargaining
history between both the NFL and NFLPA, and the NBA and
NBPA. This background information provides a framework for
understanding events leading up to the adoption of both leagues'
current agreements, including application of the antitrust laws to
each leagues' collective bargaining agreements. Part I also discuss-
es the changes in the leagues' and the players' associations bar-
gaining positions in response to court defined parameters. Part II
examines and compares the NFL's and the NBA's current collec-
tive bargaining agreements, specifically discussing provisions relat-
ing to current player mobility restrictions. Part III argues that the
optimal foundation for a system of player restraints is the NBA's
soft salary cap method, which unlike the NFL's hard salary cap,
benefits both the players and league owners over the long term.
Finally, this Note concludes that the NBA's soft salary cap pro-
vides a better foundation for a league to model its player restric-
tions upon.
I. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING HISTORY OF THE NFL & NBA
The restrictions that both leagues use to limit player mobility
have undergone substantial changes since their inception. From
various forms of the reserve clause, free agency, and college draft,
leading to the salary cap, the leagues have adapted these restric-
tions in response to court adjudication and, occasionally, player
demands.42 This part examines the historical and legal ramifica-
cussing alleged methods of NFL cap circumvention).
42. For over one century, the primary focus of sports litigation has been on the intra-
league mobility of players. PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE
[Vol. 6:243
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tions of these restrictions as incorporated into past NFL and NBA
collective bargaining agreements.
A. Collective Bargaining History Between the NFL & NFLPA
In 1968, the NFLPA 43 received certification as a labor organiza-
tion" from the NLRB, and as such, became the exclusive bargain-
ing representative45 of all NFL players.46 Until its decertification
in the early 1990s, the NFLPA bargained on behalf of the players
on numerous issues including salaries, grievance procedures, and
free agency.47
There were five collective bargaining agreements during the
twenty-two year relationship between the NFL and NFLPA. 4' The
first agreement, reached in 1968 ("1968 Agreement"), lasted two
years.49 One contentious issue for the players during the negotia-
tions of the 1968 Agreement involved the Rozelle Rule. 50 The
Rozelle Rule, or reserve clause, was a method by which NFL teams
maintained the property rights to individual players after they were
LAW 65 (1993). Before the 1960s, contract law was the legal theory upon which all
challenges to the player mobility restraints were based. Id. Since then, player challenges
have been founded upon antitrust theories, mainly because of player unionization and the
use of collective bargaining agreements. Id.
43. Kapp v. National Football League, 390 F. Supp. 73, 83 (N.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd,
586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 907 (1979). The players' association
was formed in 1956 and bargained with the NFL on behalf of the players, even though
it was not certified by the NLRB. See id.
44. A "labor organization" is defined as any organization "in which employees
participate and which exists for the purpose ... of dealing with employers concerning
grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of
work." 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1988).
45. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988), once designated the exclusive bargaining
representative, the NFLPA became the sole representative for all NFL players for purpos-
es of collective bargaining. Id.; see also Kapp, 390 F. Supp. at 83. Once a player be-,
comes part of this group he is bound by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement
under federal law. See Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 602 F. Supp. 525, 529
(S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987); J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S.
332, 335 (1944).
46. Kapp, 390 F. Supp. at 83.
47. St. Louis, supra note 33, at 1227-39.
48. Id.
49. Kapp, 390 F. Supp. at 83.
50. Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 612 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
1995]
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drafted.5' The NFLPA sought to liberalize the Rozelle Rule to
allow greater player mobility. 2 The Rozelle Rule, however, was
scarcely discussed during the negotiations, and not expressly in-
cluded in the final 1968 Agreement. 3 Rather, the 1968 Agreement
incorporated by reference the NFL Constitution and By-laws which
contained explicit provisions on the player mobility restrictions
including the Rozelle Rule, free agency, and the college draft. 4
In 1970, the players went on strike, citing playoff compensation
and pension benefits as the reasons for their second strike in two
years.5 During 1971, another agreement was reached ("1970
Agreement") and made retroactive to 1970.56 The 1970 Agreement
was the first NFL agreement to contain provisions requiring players
to sign a standard players' contract. 7 This requirement was signifi-
51. See infra note 57 (discussing the reserve clause).
52. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 612.
53. id.
54. Id. at 613.
55. St. Louis, supra note 33, at 1229.
56. Kapp, 390 F. Supp. at 83.
57. Id. The player was bound to the team for at least two years once he signed the
standard contract. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 610. This contract contained the "option rule,"
which gave the player's-team the unrestricted opportunity to renew the contract with the
amount of compensation set at not less than 90% of the prior year's salary. Kapp, 390
F. Supp. at 77. A player became a free agent by playing his option year, the last year of
his contract, instead of signing a new contract. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 610. Additional
provisions of the standard contract obligated the player to the NFL's Constitution, By-
laws, Rules and Regulations. Kapp, 390 F. Supp. at 83-84. The player was also bound
to his club's specific rules and disciplinary procedures, subject to review only by the
Commissioner, which was not appealable. id.
At this time in the history of labor-management relations concerning player restraints,
binding a player.to the NFL's Constitution, By-laws, Rules and Regulations was of
particular importance to the NFL because these documents contained the player mobility
provisions which limited the player's intra-league movement. Id. at 75-78. The first of
these provisions was the college draft rule. Id. at 75-76. This NFL rule provided that at
the annual selection meeting of the NFL clubs each team would select players, giving
them the exclusive right to that player. id. at 76. This player was then placed on the
team's reserve list and the selecting team could offer the player any compensation, which
the player then could accept or reject. Id. If the player rejected the offer, however, he
could not play for another NFL team, even if the offer was grossly inadequate. Id.
Another provision which restricted player mobility was the anti-tampering provision.
Id. This provision provided that no NFL team could negotiate with a player on the active,
reserve or selection list of another team. Id. The offending team would be penalized for
SALARY CAPS
cant because the contract explicitly bound a player to the mobility
restrictions contained in the NFL Constitution and By-laws. 8
The 1970 Agreement expired in 1974,' 9 and during the negotia-
tions for a new agreement, the NFLPA sought to repeal all existing
player mobility restrictions, in particular the Rozelle Rule.60 The
such interference which included- the loss'of selection choice in the following years' draft
or fines if the interference was intentional. Id.
The final important provision impacting the players was the so-called Rozelle Rule,
or reserve clause. Id. This Rule, named after then NFL Commissioner Alvin Ray 'Pete'
Rozelle, provided that no team could employ a player from another team, even if the
player played out his contract and became a free agent, unless satisfactory monetary
arrangements to the prior team were first negotiated. Id. at 76-77. If these arrangements
were not agreed to before the trade, the Commissioner could provide for satisfactory
compensation to the former player's club. id. This Rule, adopted in 1963, created the
free agency compensation system. Matthew S. Collins, Recent Development, 71 WASH.
U. L.Q. 1269, 1273 (1993). Prior to 1963, no compensation was given to the prior team
when a player was traded. Id.
58. See supra note 57 (discussing provisions of the uniform players' contract).
59. St. Louis, supra note 33, at 1229.
60. Id. The players first tried to eliminate the restrictive mobility rules in Kapp v.
National Football League, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974). The players alleged that
these practices were in violation of the antitrust laws because the mobility restrictions
unreasonably restrained trade. Id. at 78. The court sided with the players in striking the
practices; however, the provisions, at the time, were not part of a collective bargaining
agreement. Id. at 85. Thus, :the players again had to attack the practices when they
became incorporated into a collective bargaining agreement.
. Unlike Baseball, which has an exemption from the antitrust laws under Federal
Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc., v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259
U.S. 200 (1922) (holding that Baseball is not in interstate commerce, and thus, the anti-
trust laws were not implicated), and its progeny, the NFL is subject to the enforcement
of the antitrust laws under Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957)
(holding that Federal Baseball was restricted only to Baseball, and that the NFL had
sufficient contacts within interstate commerce to subject it to the antitrust laws). The
NBA is subject to the antitrust laws under Washington Professional Basketball Corp. v.
National Basketball Ass'n, 147 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (holding that basketball
exhibitions coupled with the sale of the rights to the interstate transmission of games
brought the NBA within the scope of the Sherman Act), and Denver Rockets v. All-Pro
Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (holding that the NBA By-law
prohibiting a basketball player who had not completed four years of college from playing
NBA. basketball constituted a group boycott in violation of the Sherman Act). Finally,
the NHL is subject to the antitrust laws under Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc., v.
Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (holding that hockey
is involved in interstate commerce and is subject to the federal antitrust laws).
Like Baseball, MLS should enjoy exemption from the antitrust laws, at least con-
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NFLPA's bargaining position, however, was weakened due to an
aborted league-wide strike during the 1974 pre-season,61 and a five
week walk-out by isolated teams at the conclusion of the 1975 pre-
season. 62 Given the union's lack of bargaining leverage, the play-
ers were forced to play without a collective bargaining agreement
for the 1974, 1975, and 1976 seasons. 63 The absence of an agree-
ment intensified player uncertainty over wages and other pertinent
employment issues. Because the NFLPA did not have the solidari-
ty to resolve the issue of player mobility through negotiations with
the NFL, the NFLPA resorted to court action. In Mackey v. Na-
tional Football League,64 the players argued that the mobility re-
strictions of the 1970 Agreement violated the antitrust laws65 be-
cerning liability under § 1 of the Sherman Act. Organized as a single corporation, MLS
will own and operate all the teams in the league. As a single entity, the league cannot
conspire or combine to restrain trade in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1 (1994). See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768
(1984) (stating that § I of the Sherman Act reaches actions only between separate entities
and not conduct that is "wholly unilateral") (citations omitted); Nelson Radio & Supply
Co. v. Motorola, Inc, 200 F.2d 911, 914 (1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953) (stating
that it is "fundamental in the law of conspiracy that you must have two persons or entities
to have a conspiracy").
61. Ethan Lock, The Scope of the Labor Exemption in Professional Sports, 1989
DUKE L.J. 339, 360.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 359.
64. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
65. Sherman Anti-Trust Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994)); Clayton Antitrust Act of October 15, 1914, ch. 323,
§ 1, 38 Stat. 730 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. & 29 U.S.C.).
Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides in relevant part, "[e]very contract, combina-
tion ... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States ... is
declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides in relevant part, "[elvery person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States...
shall be deemed guilty of a felony .... " 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
Section 6 of the Clayton Act provides:
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Noth-
ing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and
operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the
purposes of mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit,
or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully
carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the
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cause they were more restrictive than necessary to effectively main-
tain a competitively balanced league.66 The owners defended their
practices by invoking the non-statutory exemption67 from the anti-
members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspira-
cies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws.
15 U.S.C. § 17 (1994).
Section 20 of the Clayton Act states in relevant part:
No restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any court of the United
States, or a judge or the judges thereof, in any case between an employer and
employees, or between employers and employees, or between employees, or
between persons employed and persons seeking employment, involving, or
growing out of, a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment, unless
necessary to prevent irreparable injury to property, or to a property ight... for
which injury there is no adequate remedy at law ....
29 U.S.C. § 52 (1994).
66. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 609; see also Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173
(D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding that the college draft was an unreasonable restraint of trade in
violation of Sherman Act). But see Zimmerman v. National Football League, 632 F.
Supp. 398 (D.D.C. 1986) (holding no challenge could be effectively mounted against
supplemental draft where collective bargaining agreement was in effect, and agreement
spoke to this practice, based on application of non-statutory labor exemption).
67. The non-statutory labor exemption exempts from the antitrust laws certain con-
certed activities and agreements between labor and non-labor parties in the context of
collective bargaining. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No.
100, 421 U.S. 616, 622-23 (1975). In Connell, the Supreme Court opined that the exemp-
tion favored "collective bargaining under the N[ational] L[abor] R[elations] A[ct] and the
congressional policy favoring free competition in the business markets ... ." Id. at 622
(citation omitted). The exemption does not apply to agreements to eliminate competitors,
see United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 664 (1965), or agreements
outside the collective bargaining agreement. Connell, 421 U.S. at 633-35. The non-
statutory exemption protects restraints that follow naturally from the elimination of com-
petition over wages and working conditions, which do not have substantial anti-competi-
tive effects in business markets. Id. at 622. The exemption was first recognized by the
Supreme Court in Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen
of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
By contrast, the statutory labor exemption from the antitrust laws, derived from the
Clayton Antitrust Act of October 15, 1914, ch. 323, § 1, 38 Stat. 730 (codified as amend-
ed in scattered sections at 15 U.S.C. & 29 U.S.C.), and the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 104, 105, 113 (1988), declares that labor unions are not combinations or con-
spiracies in restraint of trade. Connell, 421 U.S. at 621-22. This exemption, different
from the non-statutory labor exemption, was created to protect legitimate collective
activity by employees which is, on its face, anti-competitive but favored by federal labor
policy. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 504 n.24 (1940). However, the
exemption does not apply to unions which act in concert with non-labor groups. See
Connell, 421 U.S. at 622. The limited protection of the statutory labor exemption created
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trust laws.68 This defense, if accepted, would have precluded the
court from examining provisions included in the collective bargain-
ing agreement.69  The court analyzed the Rozelle Rule and the
previous collective bargaining agreements between the NFL and
NFLPA to determine if the non-statutory labor exemption could be
invoked.70  The court reasoned that: (1) the restraint in question
could only affect the parties to the collective bargaining relation-
ship;71 (2)- the agreement had to concern a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining; 72 and (3) the agreement must be the product
of bona fide arm's length bargaining, in order for the non-statutory
labor exemption to be applied.73
The court concluded that the Rozelle Rule affected only the
parties to the agreement, thus satisfying the first prong. 74 The court
further opined that the restraint related to a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining.75 Regarding the third prong, however, the
court found that the 1970 Agreement was not the product of bona
fide negotiations.76 Thus, the Rozelle Rule was not exempt from
the antitrust scrutiny since the non-statutory labor exemption was
unavailable as a defense.77
The court next examined the jurisprudence under the Sherman
Act and determined the Rozelle Rule to be a group boycott.78  A
the need for the non-statutory exemption to protect collective bargaining situations.
68. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 609-10.
69. See supra note 67 (discussing the non-statutory labor exemption).
70. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 609-13.
71. Id. at 614. The National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-188 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993), requires that conflicts over mandatory subjects of bargaining (e.g., wages,
working conditions) be resolved in privately bargained agreements without substantial
interference from the government. Gary R. Roberts, Sports League Restraints On The
Labor Market: The Failure Of Stare Decisis, 47 U. PiTT. L. REV. 337, 340 n.8 (1986).
72. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 615.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 615-16.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 618; see also supra note 65 (discussing the antitrust laws). A group boy-
cott, or concerted refusal to deal, is defined as "an agreement by two or more persons not
to do business with other individuals or to do business with them only on specified
terms." Note, Concerted Refusals To Deal Under The Antitrust Laws, 71 HARV. L. REV.
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determination that the NFL's conduct was a group boycott would
have generally warranted application of the per se doctrine, invali-
dating the anti-competitive conduct without analysis. 79 The court,
however, declined to apply the per se doctrine, asserting that it
would be inappropriate in the present case with the district court's
substantial analysis of the restriction on file.80 Instead, the court
reviewed the Rozelle Rule under the rule of reason, l and deter-
mined that it was more restrictive then necessary to maintain the
relationship between player and team. 82  The court thus held that
the 1970 Agreement violated the antitrust laws, thereby, freeing the
1531 (1958). Concerted refusals to deal have long been recognized by the Supreme Court
as a forbidden practice. See Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 211
(1959) ('The Court... [has realized] ... that there [are] ... classes of restraints which
from their 'nature or character' were unduly restrictive .... ) (citation omitted).
79. Once it is determined that the practice is a group boycott, then the court may
declare the practice unreasonable per se in violation of the Sherman Act. Northern
Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) ("[T]here are certain agreements or
practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeem-
ing virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without
elaborate inquiry .... ).
80. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 618-20.
81. To satisfy the rule of reason test, a plaintiff must establish: (i) an agreement
between two or more individuals or business entities; (ii) the practice will injure or
unreasonably restrain competition; and (iii) the practice will subsequently cause actual
harm to competition. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football
League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1391 (9th Cir.) (citing Kaplan v. Burroughs Corp., 611 F.2d 286,
290 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 924 (1980)), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984).
The Supreme Court indicated that a non-facially invalid practice should be analyzed under
a balancing test and stated, "[tihe true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is
such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such
as may suppress or even destroy competition." Board of Trade of Chicago v. United
States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
82. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 621. The court gave four reasons for this finding:
First, little concern was manifested at trial over the free movement of average
or below average players .... Second, the Rozelle Rule is unlimited in dura-
tion. It operates as a perpetual restriction on a player's ability to sell his servic-
es in an open market throughout his career. Third, the enforcement of the.
Rozelle Rule is unaccompanied by procedural safeguards. A player has no
input into the process by which fair compensation is determined. Moreover, the
player may be unaware of the precise compensation demanded by his former
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players from the Rozelle Rule.
With its victory in Mackey, the NFLPA should have enjoyed
the benefits of an open player market for the first time.83 However,
in later agreements the NFLPA was forced to concede the victory
in Mackey in order to obtain improvements regarding pension and
disability benefits.8 4
In 1977, the NFL and NFLPA finalized a new collective bar-
gaining agreement ("1977 Agreement"), which formally eliminated
the Rozelle Rule in favor of the right of first refusal compensation
system." Although, this compensation system seemed to provide
more mobility for the players, such freedom ultimately proved
illusory.86
In 1982, after the 1977 Agreement expired, 7 negotiations to
produce a new agreement failed, resulting in a 57 day players'
strike.88 The strike's effects resulted in the 1982 Agreement ("1982
Agreement"); yet this agreement set the stage for additional con-
flicts because it resolved none of the NFLPA's complaints pertain-
ing to the right of first refusal system.89
83. Jonathan S. Shapiro, Note, Warming The Bench: The Nonstatutory Labor Exemp-
tion In The National Football League, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 1203, 1209 (1993).
84. WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 42, at 174. The union, at this time, could not
build on the Mackey victory because Mackey litigation exacted a heavy toll financially as
well as organizationally. Lock, supra note 61, at 359.
85. See Shapiro, supra note 83, at 1209. The right of first refusal compensation
system provided that a team whose contract with a player expired had the right to match
any offers that the player received from other teams. Id. at 1209 n.37. If the former team
failed to make a matching offer, the former team would lose the player to another team.
Id. If the player was lost, the team would be compensated in the form of draft choices.
Id. The difference between this system and the reserve system was that under the right
of first refusal system, the commissioner took no part in setting compensation for the
former team. Id. The right of first refusal affected only restricted free agents. Restricted
free agents are those players who, upon expiration of their current contracts, have not
completed the requisite number of seasons to become an unrestricted free agent. Unre-
stricted free agents are not subject to the right of first refusal. See discussion infra part
II.A.3 (discussing the NFL system of free agency).
86. Shapiro, supra note 83, at 1210. Fewer than 50 of the 600 players whose con-
tracts expired during the five year duration of the 1977 Agreement received offers from
other NFL teams and fewer than 20 moved between teams as part of a trade. Id. at 1209-
10.
87. Id. at 1210.
88. Id.
89. See id. In fact, during the term of the agreement, of the 1415 players whose
contracts expired, only one player received an offer from another team. Id.; see also
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In 1987, the NFLPA sought to exact gains regarding the new
generation of player mobility restrictions. Anticipating the 1982
Agreement's expiration, the players went on strike due to the re-
strictiveness of the right of first refusal.9° The league, however,
swiftly broke the strike.9 Even though the strike began in the
second week of the season, the NFL only canceled one week of
games because the owners brought in non-union replacement play-
ers.92  Thus, with the strike broken, and negotiations failing to
weaken the NFL's stance, the NFLPA once again resorted to the
courts .9 3
In Powell v. National Football League,94 the players sought an
injunction preventing the continued imposition of the right of first
refusal compensation system.95 The players argued that the contin-
ued use of the player mobility restraints after the expiration of the
1982 Agreement violated the antitrust laws. 96 The owners again
countered that the non-statutory labor exemption97 continued to
protect the player restrictions even after the agreement's expiration,
since the restrictions would have presumably met the Mackey test.98
The district court did not focus on the Mackey test and held that
the proper balance between antitrust law and labor law resulted in
the player mobility restrictions being exempt from the antitrust
laws until the parties reached an impasse.99 The district court,
WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 42, at 174.
90. Shapiro, supra note 83, at 1210-11.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1211.
94. 678 F. Supp. 777 (D. Minn. 1988), rev'd, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991). Following the decision in this case, the District of Colum-
bia Circuit held that practices included in a collective bargaining agreement would be
protected by the non-statutory labor exemption as long as those restraints operate in a
labor market characterized by collective bargaining, even if those provisions are not
specifically included in the collective bargaining agreement. Brown v. Pro Football, 50
F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
95. Powell, 678 F. Supp. at 778.
96. Id. at 781.
97. Id.; see supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing the non-statutory
exemption from the antitrust laws).
98. Powell, 678 F. Supp. at 782.
99. Id. at 789. The court defined impasse to mean the point at which, "there appears
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finding that an impasse had been reached, held for the NFLPA.1°
The court, however, the court refused to grant preliminary injunc-
tive relief to the NFLPA.10
While Powell was on appeal to the Eighth Circuit, the NFL,
fearing that the court would affirm the district court's decision and
strike the original right of first refusal, imposed a new version of
the right of first refusal system known as Plan B.' 02 The Eighth
Circuit, however, reversed the district court's determination that the
non-statutory exemption expired at impasse, and held that the prop-
er balance between the antitrust and labor laws resulted in the ex-
emption expiring only when the bargaining relationship ended be-
tween the parties.103 The court then determined that the parties still
maintained an ongoing bargaining relationship, and therefore the
players continued to be restrained by the mobility limitations.1 4
With the Powell defeat, the NFLPA sought to end application
of the non-statutory exemption in accord with the Eighth Circuit's
no realistic possibility that continuing discussions concerning the provision at issue would
be fruitful." Id. at 788.
100. Powell v. National Football League, 690 F. Supp. 812 (D. Minn. 1988).
101. Id.
102. Shapiro, supra note 83, at 1211. This new form of the right of first refusal
allowed each team to protect 37 of the 45 players on its roster. See Collins, supra note
57, at 1276. The eight remaining players became unrestricted free agents, thus free to
sign with any team without compensation owed to the players' former team. Id. The 37
protected players, however, were still subject to the original right of first refusal system.
Id.
The NFL was allowed to unilaterally impose new restrictions under prevailing labor
policy. "Unions are protected against unilateral action by employers with respect to
subjects of mandatory bargaining while negotiations over such subjects are ongoing."
Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citing NLRB v. Katz,
369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962)), cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 3414 (U.S. Dec. 8; 1995). These
protections extend only until the negotiating process ends at an impasse. Id. (citation
omitted). At that point, an employer can impose new restrictions that were included in
the employer's pre-impasse proposals. id.
103. Powell, 930 F.2d at 1304 (implicitly rejecting the Bridgeman v. National Bas-
ketball Ass'n, 675 F. Supp. 960 (D. N.J. 1987) determination that the non-statutory labor
exemption expired at impasse because it unduly insulated provisions in the expired collec-
tive bargaining agreement). See infra notes 146-48 and accompanying text (discussing
the Bridgeman holding).
104. See Powell, 930 F.2d at 1303-04.
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prescription.10 5 To end the bargaining relationship, the NFLPA
withdrew itself as the union representing all NFL players, which
effectively decertified the union.1 6 The decertification spawned a
number of lawsuits'0 7 instituted with the hope of achieving greater
player mobility by attacking the expired collective bargaining
agreement's restrictions on a number of fronts.'08 One such suit
was McNeil v. National Football League,' 9 which challenged the
NFL's Plan B right of first refusal as applied to the New York
Jets' Freeman McNeil and seven other players."l 0 The jury, in
striking down Plan B, determined that the restriction harmed com-
petition for players' services because it was more restrictive than
reasonably necessary to maintain a competitive balance between the
teams in violation of the rule of reason."' Another suit followed
to prevent the imposition of Plan B free agency on ten free agents
who were not parties to the McNeil litigation," 2 climaxing with a
class action suit for all
.
players not otherwise involved in litiga-
tion. ll3
The legal doctrine of collateral estoppel,' l4 which demands
similar results to McNeil in the other cases, forced the NFL to relax
its negotiating position regarding mobility restrictions. 1"' With the
NFL owners fearing that complete free agency would destroy the
105. Shapiro, supra note 83, at 1212.
106. WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 42, at 199.
107. See White v. National Football League, 822 F. Supp. 1389 (D. Minn. 1993),
aff'd, 41 F.3d 402 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2569 (1995) (seeking damages
and an injunction preventing the continued imposition of Plan B, league-wide); Jackson
v. National Football League, 802 F. Supp. 226 (D. Minn. 1992) (granting a temporary
injunction releasing the plaintiffs from Plan B); McNeil v. National Football League, 764
F. Supp. 1351 (D. Minn. 1991).
108. Shapiro, supra note 83, at 1212.
109. 764 F. Supp. 1351 (D. Minn. 1991).
110. Id.
111. Shapiro, supra note 83, at 1212.
112. Jackson, 802 F. Supp. at 228-29.
113. WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 42, at 164. On February 1, 1993, approximate-
ly 600 players would become free agents. Shapiro, supra note 83, at 1213.
114. Collateral estoppel is a legal doctrine which gives preclusive effect to a prior
judicial determination of fact or law in a later suit between the same parties or their
privies. See BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 261-62 (6th ed. 1990).
115. Shapiro, supra note 83, at 1214.
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league's competitive balance, and the players feeling the costs of
the lawsuits, both parties resolved to settle their disputes.' 16 Conse-
quently, the NFL and the NFLPA reached a settlement and incor-
porated this settlement into a new collective bargaining agree-
ment.
117
B. Collective Bargaining History Between the NBA & NBPA
Dating back to the certification of the NBPA in October 1967,
the NBA and NBPA have entered into ten collective bargaining
agreements.118 The NBPA first took issue with mobility restrictions
in 1970 by filing a class action lawsuit, Robertson v. National Bas-
ketball Association,119 claiming that these restrictions violated the
antitrust laws. The players specifically sought relief from the
league's college draft and reserve clause.120  Reports of the pro-
posed merger between the NBA and the American Basketball Asso-
ciation ("ABA") provided the impetus for the litigation.12 1  The
players feared that, once combined, the leagues would conspire to
eliminate competition for their services, and thus reduce their sala-
ries.1 22 The NBPA thought that if the restrictive provisions were
eliminated, the free market for their services would open, and play-
ers could demand high salaries even if the leagues combined.
After much pre-trial discovery, the parties settled, the leagues com-
bined, and on April 29, 1976, a court approved the Robertson set-
tlement agreement's ("Robertson Agreement") contents. 13  The
significant change in the Robertson Agreement was the elimination
of the reserve clause and the institution of the right of first refusal
116. Id. at 1214-15.
117. See Collins, supra note 57, at 1269; see discussion infra part II.A (discussing
the NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement).
118. National Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684, 686 (2d Cir.), petition for
cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3070 (U.S. July 24, 1995).
119. 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
120. Id. Jonathan C. Latimer, Comment, The NBA Salary Cap: Controlling Labor
Costs Through Collective Bargaining, 44 CATH. U. L. REV. 205, 217-18 (1994).
121. Robertson, 389 F. Supp. at 873.
122. Id. at 873-74.
123. Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 72 F.R.D. 64, 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1976),
aff'd, 556 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1977).
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compensation system. 124 The Robertson Agreement also provided
for judicial oversight' 25 through the appointment of a Special Mas-
ter who had the exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate and enforce the
Robertson Agreement's terms. 26 The Robertson Agreement's sub-
stantive provisions were then incorporated into the 1980 collective
bargaining agreement ("1980 Agreement").1 27
The 1980 Agreement expired in 1982, and was modified in
1983 by a Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU"), which the
court approved. 28 The MOU added a player mobility restriction in
the form of a salary cap 129 to the then-existing NBA system of
player restraints. 30 The MOU provided that each team, through the
1986-87 season, pay players a certain percentage of overall NBA
gross revenue, and allowed teams to pay more than this specified
amount under certain circumstances.1
3
'
The same year that the salary cap was imposed, Leon Wood, a
player recently drafted by the Philadelphia 76ers, sued the NBA,
alleging that the salary cap violated the antitrust laws. 132 Wood
argued that players with similar talents were receiving inequitable
salaries due to the ability of their team to work within the salary
cap's restrictions. 133 Wood objected to receiving less compensation
because the Philadelphia 76ers had less available money to pay him
124. See St. Louis, supra note 33, at 1252.
125. Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 602 F. Supp. 525, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1984),
aff'd, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
126. See St. Louis, supra note 33, at 1253.
127. Bridgeman, 675 F. Supp. at 962.
128. Id. at 962-63.
129. The salary cap was developed during the 1983 negotiations by NBPA leader
Larry Fleisher and NBA Commissioner Larry O'Brien. WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note
42, at 300. The incentive for proposing such a system was that the majority of NBA
teams were losing money and a few teams were on the verge of insolvency. Id. The
original idea, however, was formulated by NFLPA leader Ed Garvey during the 1982
NFL negotiations. Id. at 301. It is ironic that, at the time, the NFL owners rejected this
form of socialism as an invasion on their property rights in a capitalist system, because
ten years later, a cap was imposed. Id. at 302.
130. See Wood, 602 F. Supp. at 527.
131. Id.; see discussion infra part II.B.4 (discussing NBA salary cap).
132. Wood, 602 F. Supp. at 526.
133. Id.; see also Jeffrey E. Levine, The Legality and Efficacy of the National Bas-
ketball Association Salary Cap, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 71, 72 (1992).
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under their cap than, for example, the Chicago Bulls had to pay
Michael Jordan under the Bulls' cap. 134 The district court, using
the three-part test developed in Mackey135 to determine whether the
non-statutory labor exemption applied, upheld the salary cap as
incorporated into the MOU. 136 The Second Circuit affirmed this
decision. 37
One year later, in 1985, trouble arose concerning the interpreta-
tion of the salary cap's provisions. The New York Knickerbockers
("Knicks") attempted to sign Albert King to replace Leonard Rob-
inson, who failed to renew his contract with the Knicks. 13  The
King negotiations led to a disagreement between the Knicks and
the NBA over the proper interpretation of the salary cap. 139 After
an independent arbiter found for the NBA,14 the Knicks modified
their offer by providing a large bonus to King in the first contract
year to supplement the relatively low salary throughout the balance
of the contract. 41 The NBA challenged the bonus as a cap circum-
vention method. 4 2 The Special Master held for the Knicks; noting
that the NBA previously allowed these signing bonuses, and thus,
could not disallow them now. 4 3 The district court reversed the
Special Master's decision, holding that the Knicks violated the
1983 Agreement by using the signing bonus to circumvent the
salary cap.'"
When the 1983 Agreement expired in 1987, the NBA and the
NBPA entered into a Moratorium Agreement that eliminated the
134. Levine, supra note 133, at 88.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 71-73 (discussing the Mackey test).
136. Wood, 602 F. Supp. at 528.
137. Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
138. In re National Basketball Ass'n, 630 F. Supp. 136, 137-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
139. Id. at 138. Article IlI.C(2)(c)(i) of the 1983 Agreement allowed a team exceed-
ing its salary cap to replace a retired player at fifty percent of that player's salary. Id. at
138. However, the Knicks believed that the proper provision was Article III.C(2)(e)




142. id. at 138-39.
143. Id. at 139.
144. Id.: at 141.
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risk of a lawsuit by either party to facilitate the negotiation of a
new agreement. 145 When the Moratorium Agreement expired and
there was no new agreement, the players instituted another law-
suit"' arguing that the continued imposition of the college draft,
salary cap, and right of first refusal, after the expiration of the 1983
Agreement, violated the antitrust laws. 147 In Bridgeman v. National
Basketball Association, the court held that if the league were to
impose similar provisions, the non-statutory exemption would pro-
tect those restrictions. 48 The court further ruled that the NBA and
NBPA bargaining relationship continued as long as the league im-
posed restrictions similar to those included under the expired agree-
ment and expected these restrictions to be part of the new agree-
ment. "'49 This decision forced the parties to the negotiate and pro-
duced the 1988 Agreement.
In 1993, another team, the Portland Trailblazers, tried to cir-
cumvent the salary cap. The general manager of the Portland team,
seeking to sign Chris Dudley, an unrestricted free agent, suggested
an option-out clause exercisable by Dudley after the first year of
his multi-year contract. 50 This clause would have allowed Dudley
to become a Trailblazer free agent.' 5' Once free from the contract,
the team would be permitted to re-sign Dudley to a contract equal
to his fair market value without being constrained by the team's
salary cap due to an available exception. 5 2 A federal district court
affirmed the Special Master's decision which held that the one year
option-out clause did not circumvent the 1988 Agreement on two
grounds: first, the 1988 Agreement did not expressly forbid such
contracts; and second, the NBA previously approved such mea-
145. National Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, 857 F. Supp. 1069, 1071-72 (S.D.N.Y.
1994), aff'd, 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3070 (U.S. July
24, 1995).
146. Bridgeman v. National Basketball Ass'n, 675 F. Supp. 960 (D. N.J. 1987).
147. Id. at 964.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 965-67.
150. Bridgeman v. National Basketball Ass'n, 838 F. Supp. 172, 175 (D. N.J. 1993).
151. Id.
152. Id.; see infra notes 239 -4 i (discussing NBA veteran player exception).
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sures,153 thus allowing teams to circumvent the cap.
Before the 1988 Agreement expired in the summer of 1994, 1 4
the NBA, anticipating court action by the NBPA, sought a declara-
tory judgment asserting that the player mobility restrictions con-
tained in the expired 1988 Agreement did not violate the antitrust
laws155 -revisiting the issue decided in Bridgeman and Powell.
The impetus behind the declaratory judgment action was the refusal
of the players to negotiate. 56 Federal District Court Judge Duffy
refused to grant the NBA the injunction, holding that the non-statu-
tory labor exemption continued to provide the league with immuni-
ty from the antitrust laws under the holding of Powell.157 The
Second Circuit affirmed the determination, denying the injunc-
tion.58
To maintain the 1994-95 season while the NBA and NBPA
negotiated a new agreement, the NBA agreed not to lockout the
players in return for the NBPA promising not to strike. 5 9 Even
though the season was saved, players dissatisfied with the salary
cap and the mobility restrictions sued the league, alleging antitrust
violations.' 6° In order to sue the league, these players had to decer-
tify the NBPA, in accord with National Basketball Association v.
Williams, as the bargaining representative of NBA players.' 6' This
would have ended the league's use of the non-statutory labor ex-
emption in accord with Powell.162 The parties, however, negotiated
a new agreement before the decertification vote, 163 and the players
voted, in an "all or nothing" vote, to end the decertification move-
153. Bridgeman, 838 F. Supp. at 180-84.
154. Williams, 857 F. Supp. at 1072.
155. Id. at 1071.
156. See Williams, 45 F.3d at 686.
157. Williams, 857 F. Supp. at 1078.
158. Williams, 45 F.3d at 685.
159. Chass, N.B.A. and Players Agree, supra note 38.
160. Chass, N.B.A. Faces Antitrust Suit, supra note 38.
161. Id.
162. Powell v. National Football League, 678 F. Supp. 777 (D. Minn. 1988), rev'd,
930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991).




II. THE CURRENT NFL & NBA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREE-
MENTS
Both the 1993 NFL Agreement1 65 and the 1995 NBA Outline
of the proposed NBA agreement 66 contain provisions that affect
the players in a myriad of ways. Most important to this discussion
are the provisions concerning the player mobility restrictions.
A. The NFL Agreement
The 1993-2000 NFL Agreement covers a wide range of topics
pertaining to league operations and governance. 67 The player mo-
164. Chass, N.B.A. Players Support Union, supra note 38.
165. NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement, 1993-2000 (on file with the Fordham
Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal) [hereinafter the 1993 NFL
Agreement].
166. See infra note 210 and accompanying text. At the time of this writing the terms
of the new collective bargaining agreement have not been finalized and are subject to
change.
167. The Preamble provides that the 1993 NFL Agreement is the product of bona
fide, arms length negotiations, within the provisions of the applicable labor laws and
between the appropriate bargaining units of the respective parties. 1993 NFL Agreement,
supra note 165, at 1. This statement is significant because it clearly states the intent of
the parties to take advantage of the non-statutory labor exemption under the prescription
of Mackey. Most of the provisions contained in the 1993 NFL Agreement are beyond the
scope of this Note, but they include, "No StrikefLockout/Suit" provisions, stating that the
NFLPA and its constituent members will not institute any interference with league opera-
tions or lawsuit for alleged antitrust violations; the NFLPA, however, reserves the right
to bring suit for breaches of the 1993 NFL Agreement. 1993 NFL Agreement, supra note
165, art. IV, at 9-10. The owners, in return, will not lockout the players. Id. The provi-
sions relating to "Union Security" provide that if a player becomes a union member he
must maintain his membership in good standing or face possible suspension. Id. art. V,
at 11-13. "NFLPA Agent Certification" provides for the licensing and regulation of
player agents by the NFLPA with oversight by the NFL. Id. art. VI, at 14. The article
concerning the "Club Discipline" provides for the sanctioning of players by individual
teams for overweight players, late reporting to training camp, throwing footballs into
stadium seating, unexcused absences from training camp, failure to follow rehabilitation
programs, ejection from a game, and conduct detrimental to the club. Id. art. VIII, at 16-
17.
The 1993 NFL Agreement also provides for non-injury grievance and injury griev-
ance procedures. Id. art. IX-X, at 18-28. The provisions concerning "Commissioner
Discipline" provide for the sanctioning of players by the NFL Commissioner for instances
of unnecessary roughness or unsportsmanlike conduct. Id. art. XI, at 29-30. "Injury
Protection" provisions provide that players under certain circumstances will be compensat-
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bility restrictions included in the document are the college draft,
right of first refusal, free agency restrictions, and caps on rookie
and veteran salaries.
1. The College Draft
The college draft is the method by which college football play-
ers are selected by league teams. 168  The 1993 NFL Agreement
provides for a seven-round college draft with as many .selection
choices during the draft as there are teams.,169 Additionally, a com-
pensation round is provided for teams that lost free agents at the
end of the prior season.17° The 1993 NFL Agreement contains
specific periods in which a rookie may sign contracts offered to
him. 17 ' A drafted rookie may also sign with another professional
football league, but the drafting NFL team would retain the exclu-
sive right to that player's services for three years following that
player's selection.1 72 The trading of drafted rookies is also permit-
ted. 173  Undrafted players may be selected by any team after the
ed for severe injury sustained during a game. Id. art. XII, at 31-32. The 1993 NFL
Agreement also provides for an impartial arbitrator to decide specific controversies be-
tween the parties, as defined in the 1993 NFL Agreement. Id. art. XXXVII, at 95-96.
There are provisions stating that no team shall interfere with another team's ability to
decide whether or not to negotiate with an individual player and whether or not to exer-
cise a right of first refusal. Id. art. XXXVIII, at 97-102. The 1993 NFL Agreement also
dictates the size of the active roster of players and practice squad size. id. arts. XX-
XXXIV, at 110-11. The 1993 NFL Agreement provides for the establishment of
mini-camps and pre-season training camps. Id. arts. XXXVI-XXXVII, at 113-14. There
are also provisions concerning player payment for the pro-bowl game, id. art. XLIII, at
125, "Players' Rights To Medical Care And Treatment," id. art. XLIV, at 126-27, retire-
ment plans, id. art. XLVII, at 132-38, "Group Insurance," "Severance Pay," and "Supple-
mental Disability Benefits," id. arts. XLIX-LI, at 141-46, and "Workers' Compensation,"
id. art. LIV, at 150-51.
168. 1993 NFL Agreement, supra note 165, art. XVI, at 39-43.
169. Id. art. XVI, § 2, at 39.
170. Id.
171. If the drafted rookie has not signed a contract 30 days before the beginning of
the season, then he may sign only with the selecting team until the following year's draft.
1993 NFL Agreement, supra note 165, art. XVI, § 4(b), at 40. A drafted rookie has until
the tenth week of the regular season to accept the drafting team's offer, id. art. XVI, §
4(a), at 39, and after this deadline he may not play that season, absent a showing of
extreme personal hardship. Id. art. XVI, § 4(c), at 40.
172. Id. art. XVI, § 5, at 40.
173. If the drafting team releases the prospective player, the rookie may sign with
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completion of the college and supplemental drafts. 174 The 1993
NFL Agreement also requires all drafted players to sign a uniform
players' contract.
17 5
2. Rookie Salary Limitations
The Entering Player Pool is the salary cap that affects rook-
ies. 176 As defined by the 1993 NFL Agreement, the Entering Play-
er Pool is the league-wide limitation on aggregate salaries that may
be paid to all drafted rookies. 77 In 1993, the applicable amount
was $56 million, or $2 million per team. 817  For each successive
year, the amount is the greater of: (1) two million dollars multi-
plied by the number of teams in the league,179 (2) three and one
half percent of Defined Gross Revenues,18° or (3) a sum equal to
the previous years' aggregate amount, providing for adjustments
based on compensatory picks that a team may receive when losing
a franchise 18 or transition 182 player.183 Further, minor adjustments
are possible based on whether a team waives or signs its rookies.
84
Today, the Entering Player Pool is set at three to five million dol-
lars, depending on available adjustments.
any other team, without penalty to himself or to the new team. Id. § 4(a), at 39. A
drafting team may trade a drafted rookie, but then the acquiring team must immediately
extend an offer to that player. Id. § 4(b), at 40. If the drafting team signs the rookie and
then trades him, the acquiring team must count the rookie's entire salary towards the
Entering Player Pool. Id. § 4(a), at 39-40.
174. Id. § 11, at 43.
175. Id. art. XIV, at 35. This standardized contract contains boilerplate clauses
providing for the term, services required, and payment to the player. Id. Appendix C, at
165-73.
176. 1993 NFL Agreement, supra note 165, art. XVII, § 1(a), at 44-46.
177. Id. at 44.
178. Id. art. XVII, § 3(a), at 44.
179. Id.
180. Id; see infra note 203 and accompanying text (discussing Defined Gross Reve-
nues).
181. See infra notes 195-97 and accompanying text (discussing franchise player
designation).
182. See infra notes 198-201 and accompanying text (discussing transition player
designation).
183. 1993 NFL Agreement, supra note 165, art. XVII, § 3(a), at 44-45.
184. See id. art. XVII, § 4, at 45-46.
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3. Free Agency Restrictions
The 1993 NFL Agreement also contains provisions concerning
veteran free agency, franchise, and transition players. 8 5 Regarding
veteran free agency, a player becomes an unrestricted free agent
upon completing four or more Accrued Seasons18 6 in a capped
year. 8 7 Once four years are completed, the player may sign with
any team without penalty or restriction to the player or the acquir-
ing team. 8
Any player with three or more Accrued Seasons, but less than
four in a capped year, becomes a restricted free agent upon the
expiration of the player's current contract.18 9  A restricted free
agent may negotiate with any team. The player's prior team, how-
ever, has the right to match any offer made to the player' 9° and
retain the player. This right is called the right of first refusal.' 9'
The 1993 NFL Agreement also provides that veterans with less
than three Accrued Seasons whose contracts expire may only re-
sign with their prior team, unless the prior team either fails to offer
or withdraws the Required Tender. 92 In addition, the 1993 NFL
Agreement sets minimum salaries for players with less than three
years of Accrued Seasons.'93
185. id. arts. XVIII-XXv, at 47-91.
186. A player receives an "Accrued Season" for every season that he was or should
have been on full pay status for six or more games during the regular season. Id. art.
XVIII, § 1(a), at 47.
187. Id. art. XIX, § 1(a), at 49.
188. Id. In the event that the player has not signed with a new team by the begin-
ning of training camp, then the player may only sign with the player's former team. Id.
art. XIX, § l(b)(i), at 49. Moreover, if the player has not signed with the player's former
team by the tenth week of the regular season, then the player may not play football that
year. Id. art. XIX, § l(b)(ii), at 49.
189. Id. art. XIX, § 2(a), at 50.
190. Id. art. XIX, § 2(b), at 50-51.
191. Id.
192. Id. art. XVIII, § 2, at 47. "Required Tender" is defined as "tender that a club
is required to make to a player pursuant to this Agreement, either as a matter of right.
or to receive Rights of First Refusal, Draft Choice Compensation and/or other rights
.... "1 Id. art. I, § 2(ac), at 4.
193. Id. § 3, at 47-48. The minimum salary is $100,000 for players with less than
one credited season, $125,000 for players with one credited season, and $150,000 for
players with two or more credited seasons. Id. art. XVIII, § 3, at 47.
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Other free agency provisions enable a team to designate one
Franchise Player and two Transition Players. 194 Every season, each
club is permitted to designate as a Franchise Player one of its play-
ers who would otherwise become an unrestricted free agent at the
end of that season. 195  During the period of his designation as a
Franchise Player, the player can only negotiate with the designating
club, regardless of the player's number of Accrued Seasons.' 96 To
ensure fairness, there are specific requirements as to the Required
Tender and length of contract for a player designated as a Fran-
chise Player. 197
Two unrestricted free agents may be selected as Transition
Players.19 8 Players are selected twice, one player in 1994 and one
player in 1999.199 Unlike the Franchise Player designation, a Tran-
sition Player may negotiate with other teams, however, the player
is subject to the prior team's right of first refusal.2 ° The 1993
NFL Agreement also specifies the Required Tender for Transition
Players.2 1
4. Veteran Salary Limitations
The salary cap provisions 22 begin with definitions of Defined
Gross Revenues and Salary.20 3 Under the 1993 NFL Agreement,
194. Id. art. XX, at 60-68.
195. Id. art. XX, § 1, at 60.
196. Id.
197. Id. § 2, at 60-62. The Required Tender for franchise players is the average of
the five largest salaries paid to the player, or 120 percent of the player's last salary,
whichever is greater. Id. art. XX, § 2(c)(i), at 61.
.198. Id. art. XX, § 3(a), at 62.
199. Id.
200. Id. art. XX, § 3(b), at 62.
201. Id. art. XX, § 4, at 62-63. Required Tender for Transition Players is the aver-
age of the ten largest salaries paid to the player or 120 percent of the player's last salary,
whichever is greater. Id. art. XX, § 4(a), at 62.
202. See 1993 NFL Agreement, supra note 165, art. XXIV, at 74-89.
203. id. art. XXIV, § l(a), at 74. "Defined Gross Revenues" is defined as:
(i) the aggregate revenues received or to be received on an accrual basis,
for or with respect to a League Year during the term of this Agreement, by the
NFL and all NFL Teams (and their designees), from all sources, whether known
or unknown, derived from, relating to or arising out of the performance of
players in NFL football games, with only the specific exceptions set forth be-
low. The NFL and each NFL Team shall.in good faith act and use their best
efforts, consistent with sound business judgment, so as to maximize Defined
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starting in 1993 and continuing every year thereafter during the
term of the 1993 NFLAgreement, the salary cap is triggered when
total player costs for the league equal or exceed 67 percent of De-
fined Gross Revenues. 2  Once the salary cap is triggered, the
Gross Revenues for each playing season during the term of this Agreement.
Defined Gross Revenues shall include, without limitation:
(1) regular season, pre-season, and post-season gate receipts (net of admis-
sion taxes, and surcharges paid to stadium or municipal authorities which are
deducted for purposes of calculating gate receipts subject to revenue sharing),
including ticket revenue from "luxury boxes," suites and premium seating sub-
ject to gate receipt sharing among NFL Teams; and
(2) proceeds including Copyright Royalty Tribunal and extended market
payments from the sale,- license or other conveyance of the right to broadcast
or exhibit NFL pre-season, regular season and play-off games on radio and
television including, without limitation, network, local, cable, pay television,
satellite encryption, international broadcasts, delayed broadcasts (which shall not
include any broadcast of an NFL pre-season, regular season or play-off game
occurring more than 72 hours after the live exhibition of the game, unless the
broadcast is the first broadcast in the market), and all other means of distribu-
tion, net of any reasonable and customary NFL expenses related to the project;
and
(3) proceeds from the sale or conveyance of any right to receive any of the
revenues described above.
(ii) The following is a nonexclusive list of examples of revenue received
by the NFL and/or NFL Teams which are not derived from, and do not relate
to or arise out of the performance of players in NFL football games (and are
therefore not "'DGR"): proceeds from the assignment, sale or trade of Player
Contracts, proceeds from the sale of any existing NFL franchise (or any interest
therein) or the grant of NFL expansion franchises, dues or capital contributions
received by the NFL, fines, "revenue sharing" among NFL Teams, interest in-
come, insurance recoveries, and sales of interests in real estate and other proper-
ty.
(iii) Notwithstanding subsection l(a)(i) above, the following shall be con-
sidered "Excluded DGR'"and not included in Defined Gross Revenues: reve-
nues derived from -concessions, parking, local advertising and promotion,
signage, magazine advertising, local sponsorship agreements, stadium clubs,
luxury box income other than that included in subsection l(a)(i)(1) above, sales
of programs and novelties, and any categories of revenue (other than those
listed in subsections l(a)(i)(l)-(3) above) currently included under NFL Films
and NFL Properties, Inc. and its subsidiaries.
Id. art. XXIV, § 1, at 74-75.
"Salary" is defined as any "compensation in money, property, investments, loans or
anything else of value to which an NFL player ... is entitled in accordance with a Player
Contract .... "Id. art., XXIV, § l(c)(i), at 77.
204. Id. art. XXIV, § 2, at 77.
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guaranteed salary amount, or salary floor, is at least 58 percent of
Defined Gross Revenues. 20 5  The cap provisions specify that the
maximum amount of players salaries equal 64 percent of Projected
Defined Gross Revenues 2°6 in the first capped year, 63 percent in
the second capped year, and 62 percent in any year thereafter.2 7
The 1993 NFL Agreement also provides for the computation of
team salary to determine if a team is over the proscribed limit.208
Finally, the 1993 NFL Agreement contains no exceptions to the
salary cap, rendering the NFL cap method a hard salary cap.
B. The NBA Agreement
The most recent NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement expired
after the last playoff game at the end of the 1993-1994 season.209
In August 1995, however, the NBA and NBPA agreed to a new
collective bargaining agreement, 'effective from the 1995-96 NBA
season through the 2000-01 season.10  The 1995 NBA Outline 21 1
205. Id. art. XXIV, § 3, at 77-78.
206. "Projected Defined Gross Revenues" is defined as Defined Gross Revenues for
the previous year plus specific percentage increases. Id. art. XXIV, § 10(b), at 87-88.
207. 1993 NFL Agreement, supra note 165, art. XXIV, § 4(a), at 78. However, the
salary cap amount can be adjusted if total player costs for a capped year fall below
certain percentages. Id. art. XXIV, § 4(b), at 78.
208. Id. art. XXIV, § 6, at 79-81. Included in the computation of Team Salary are:
all players contracts, all drafted rookie offers, practice squad contracts, termination pay,
50% of a player's salary when the player files a grievance until the league year is finished
or the grievance is resolved, and any expansion bonus. Id. The 1995 NFL Agreement
also prescribes the manner in which player contracts should be valued, the valuation of
signing bonuses, acceleration of the player's contract, and guaranteed contracts. Id. art.
XXIV, § 7(b)-(d), at 81-84.
209. Collective Bargaining Agreement between the National Basketball Association
and the National Basketball Players' Association, November 1, 1988, reprinted in LAW
OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS, app. 7A (Gary A. Uberstine ed. 1988) [herein-
after 1988 NBA Agreement].
210. Outline and Key Terms of Collective Bargaining Agreement Between NBA and
NBPA (on file with the Fordham Intellectual Property,- Media & Entertainment Law
Journal) [hereinafter 1995 NBA Outline].
211. Although the 1995 NBA Agreement has not been finalized and made available
to the public, this author assumes that the 1988 NBA Agreement's provisions that were
not specifically changed by the 1995 NBA Outline will remain substantially similar.
The 1988 NBA Agreement provided that the players receive league-wide severance
pay, medical and life insurance, and disability insurance. 1988 NBA Agreement, supra
note 209, art. II, § 1, at 7-61. It also provided that compensation and expenses are to be
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describes the provisions relating to those important to this discus-
sion: the college draft, free agency restrictions, and rookie and
veteran salary caps.
1. The College Draft
The 1988 NBA Agreement provided for a college draft consist-
ing of two rounds, with the number of selection choices equal to
the number of NBA teams at the time of the draft212 which the new
agreement continues. However, the 1995 NBA Outline states that,
beginning in 1998, the college draft will be reduced to one
round.213 Also proscribed by the 1988 NBA Agreement were pro-
visions regarding the term and time a drafted rookie may accept an
offer.2"4 For instance, once drafted, the college player may only
paid when the player is on active duty with a military reserve unit. Id. art. III, § 1, at 7-
63. Any disputes about the interpretation of the 1988 NBA Agreement were determined
by a Special Master. Id. art. VIII, § 2, at 7-95 to 7-96. The 1988 NBA Agreement also
provided that no NBA employee could collude to interfere with the ability of a player to
negotiate with an unrestricted free agent, submit an offer sheet to a restricted free agent,
or exercise the right of first refusal. Id. art. IX, § 1, at 7-96. Enforcement of the anti-
collusion provisions provides for a hearing before the Special Master. Id. art. X, § 1, at
7-97. Additionally, there were certification provisions which provided that, under the
penalties of perjury, all terms of a player's agreement were disclosed. Id. art. XI, § l(a),
at 7-101. The 1988 NBA Agreement provided for travel accommodations, locker room
facilities, and parking. Id. art. XIV, at 7-103 to 7-104. There were provisions for playoff
compensation, dues for the NBPA, the maximum number of games, and the All-Star
game. Id. arts. XV-XVIII, at 7-104 to 7-105. Medical treatment of the players was also
provided. Id. art. XIX, at 7-105 to 7-106. The 1988 NBA Agreement provided that no
contract clauses could prohibit an NBA team from trading a player. Id. art. XXI, § 1, at
7-107. The 1988 NBA Agreement also provided for grievance and arbitration procedures,
id. art. XXVIII, at 7-113 to 7-119, player agent certification, id. art. XXXI, at 7-119 to
7-120, and the drug rehabilitation program, id. art. XX, at 7-120 to 7-126. Other provi-
sions included the size of the roster, id. art. XXVI, § 1, at 7-110 to 7-111, the written
critique of referees, id. art. XXVI, § 2, at 7-111, and options to retired players to purchase
season tickets, id. art. XXVI, § 3, at 7-111.
The 1995 NBA Outline stated an increase in the amount of life and health insurance,
and pension payments to be made by the league. 1995 NBA Outline, supra note 210, at
4. Other provisions address an increase in players' per diem, id. at 6, training camp
compensation, id., All-Star game player payments, id., and fines and suspensions. Id.
212. 1988 NBA Agreement, supra note 209, art. IV, § l(a), at 7-64.
213. 1995 NBA Outline, supra note 210, at 5.
214. 1988 NBA Agreement, supra note 209, art. IV, § 1, at 7-65 to 7-67. If a player
is drafted but does not sign a contract and is not redrafted the subsequent year, the player
becomes a free agent. Id. § 1(d), at 7-65. If a drafted rookie is not offered the Required
Tender, the player becomes free to sign with any team without restriction in the Septem-
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sign with his selecting team until the next college draft,"' although,
this was contingent upon the selecting team offering the drafted
player the Required Tender by September following the initial
draft.216 Furthermore, a high school player who renounced his
college eligibility may be drafted by any team.21 7 Finally, the 1988
NBA Agreement required all drafted players to sign a uniform
players' contract. 2" All of these provisions, this author assumes,
will be incorporated into the new agreement without substantial
modification.
2. Rookie Salary Limitations
Prior to the new agreement, there were no rookie salary limita-
tions in the NBA. The 1995 NBA Outline states that each first
round drafted player receive a three year guaranteed contract within
20 percent of the Rookie Scale amount.2 9 This scale amount in-
ber following the draft. Id. art. IV, § 1(e), at 7-65. Moreover, if the drafted player does
not sign a contract the immediate year following the draft, then the drafting team retains
the exclusive right to that player's services for one year. Id. art. IV, § l(f), at 7-65.
However, if the player does not bargain in good faith with the drafting team, or the
contract provides for additional one year periods, then the drafting team maintains the
exclusive right to that player. Id. art. IV, § l(g), at 7-65 to 7-66. A team which subse-
quently drafts a player who has been previously drafted and offered the Required Tender
is the only team that the player may negotiate with, provided that the acquiring team has
offered the Required Tender. Id. art. IV, § 1(c), at 7-64. If the player does not sign with
the subsequent team within one year of the subsequent draft, the player becomes free to
sign with any team. Id. art. IV, § 1(c), at 7-64 to 7-65.
"Required Tender" is defined in the 1988 NBA Agreement as: (i) a contract person-
ally delivered to the player or his personal representative and (ii) a player contract having
as a minimum term one year and paying the player at least the minimum salary specified
for that year. Id. art. IV, § 1(b), at 7-64. The 1995 NBA Outline changes the Required
Tender for first round draftees to a guaranteed three-year contract with the contract
amount subject to the Rookie Scale. 1995 NBA Outline, supra note 210, Rookie Salary
Cap, at 5. While there are no maximum amounts for second round draftees, there are
minimums. Id.
215. 1988 NBA Agreement, supra note 209, art. IV, § 1(b), at 7-64.
216. Id.
217. Id. art. IV, § 1(h), at 7-66.
218. Id. art. I, at 7-45 to 7-60. The contract provides for uniformity in the provision-
al language for all players' contracts concerning services performed, length of contract,
and payment. Id. The contract also provides for specialized compensation arrangements,
including hotel rooms, loans, personal guarantees, game tickets, and promotional appear-
ances. Id. art. I, § 3(b), at 7-45 to 7-46. The contract terminates upon the death of the
player, the lack of skill, or disability (mental or otherwise). Id. art. I, § 3(d), at 7-46.
219. 1995 NBA Outline, supra note 210, at 5. The Rookie Scale amount provides
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creases each year.220 The 1995 NBA Outline also describes a mini-
mum rookie salary for second round draftees and undrafted rook-
ies.221 Finally, the maximum length of contract a first round draft-
ee may sign is for three years. 222 All others may sign for a maxi-
mum of seven years.223
3. Free Agency Restrictions
Before the new agreement, NBA players were subject to re-
stricted and unrestricted free agency.224 Unrestricted free agency
was available following the conclusion of the 1992-93 season, the
last season of the 1988 NBA Agreement, for any veteran player
with four or more years service in the NBA.225._ Unrestricted free
agency allowed players to offer their services to any team without
being subject to the prior team's right of first refusal.226 The right
of first refusal provided that the prior team could match any offer
from another team to keep the player. A restricted free agent was
defined as a player with less than four years of service and subject
to the prior team's right of first refusal.227 Under both restricted
and unrestricted free agency, no compensation was given to the
prior team for losing a player.228
The 1995 NBA Outline, however, describes changes in this
system.229 The 1995 NBA Outline states that restricted free agency
and the right of first refusal are to be eliminated. 30 Upon comple-
tion of their contracts, all players would become unrestricted free
agents.23' Thus, with the elimination of free agency restrictions, the
specific amounts that rookies may be paid, depending on the order of selection. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. The minimum starting salary is $200,000 for 1995-96, and it increases 10
percent annually. Id.
222. Id. at 6.
223. Id.
224. 1988 NBA Agreement, supra note 209, art. V, at 7-68 to 7-77.
225. Id. art. V, § l(a)(l), at 7-68.
226. Id.
227. ld.
228. See id. art. V, at 7-68 to 7-77.





market for players' services would only be limited by the salary
cap.
4. Veteran Salary Limitations
These provisions2 32 begin with a definition of Defined Gross
Revenues and Salary.233 Further defined is "Team Salary" as the
232. 1988 NBA Agreement, supra note 209; art. VII, at 7-77 to 7-95.
233. id. art. VII, Part A, § 1, at 7-77. The 1988 NBA Agreement defines "Defined
Gross Revenues" as:
$1,000,000 plus the aggregate revenues received or to be received on an accrual
basis, for or with respect to a playing season during the term of this Agreement,
by the NBA and all NBA Teams other than Expansion Teams... during their
first two seasons (but including the Expansions Teams' shares of national net-
work and cable television revenues), from all sources, whether known or un-
known, derived from, relating to or arising out of the performance of players
in NBA basketball games, but not including revenues derived from the All Star
Game, concessions, parking, sales of programs and novelties, NBA Properties,
Inc. and its subsidiaries .... Defined Gross Revenues shall include, without
limitation:
(i) regular season gate receipts, net of admission taxes;
(ii) proceeds from the sale, license or other, conveyance of the right to
broadcast or exhibit NBA preseason, regular season and playoff games on radio
and television including, without limitation, network, local, cable and pay televi-
sion, and all other means of distribution, net of reasonable or customary expens-
es related thereto;
(iii) exhibition game proceeds, net of admission taxes and all reasonable
or customary game, pre-season and training camp expenses; and
(iv) playoff gate receipts, net of admission taxes, arena rentals and all other
reasonable or customary expenses except the player playoff pool.
It is understood that the following is a non-exclusive list of examples of reve-
nues received by the NBA and/or NBA Teams which are not derived from, and
do not relate to or arise out of the performance of players in NBA basketball
games: proceeds from the assignment, sale or trade of Player Contracts, pro-
ceeds from the sale of any existing NBA franchise (or any interest therein) or
the grant of NBA expansion franchises, dues or capital contributions received
by the NBA, fines, "revenue sharing" among Teams, interest income, insurance
recoveries, and sales of interests in real estate and other property.
id. art. VII, Part A, § l(a)(1), at 7-77 to 7-78.
The 1995 NBA Outline expands the definition of Defined Gross Revenues to encom-
pass income from all sources, including income from luxury boxes, signage, sponsorships,
parking, and concessions among others. 1995 NBA Outline, supra note 210, at 1.
"Salary" is defined as:
compensation in Money, Property, Investments or anything else of value to
which an NBA player (including a player whose contract has been terminated
in accordance with the NBA's waiver procedure) or a person or entity designat-
19951
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aggregate Salary under all offers and players' contracts, whether or
not the player is on an active roster,234 which then defines how to
value a team's salary.235
The expired 1988 NBA Agreement provided that the salary cap
for all NBA teams equal 53 percent of Defined Gross Revenues.236
The 1995 NBA Outline, however, states that this percentage will
be adjusted to ensure the players receive a greater absolute dollar
amount of the new calculation of Defined Gross Revenues, which
includes all basketball related revenue.237
Generally, the NBA rules demand that teams may not exceed
the salary cap; there are, however, specific exceptions, thus making
it a soft cap.238 The first exception is the veteran player excep-
tion,239 which allows a team to re-sign its own free agent for any
amount, provided the player played with the team for at least three
ed by a player is entitled in accordance with a Player Contract, but not includ-
ing Benefits. Salary with respect to any period shall include all Salary actually
payable with respect to such period under the terms of Player Contract and all
Salary attributable to such period under the terms of this Agreement.
(1) A player's Salary shall also include any and all consideration received
by the player or any person or entity controlled by or related to the player from
any person or entity affiliated with, related to or controlled by the player's
Team or any person or entity owning an interest in the Team ("Team Affili-
ate"), even if such consideration is ostensibly paid to the player for services
other than basketball playing services if the NBA can demonstrate either that:
(i) the consideration paid to the player for such nonbasketball services does
not represent a reasonable approximation of the fair market value of such ser-
vices as performed by such player; or
(ii) the consideration paid to the player for performing basketball services
represents less than a reasonable approximation of the fair market value of such
player's basketball services.
1988 NBA Agreement, supra note 209, art. VII, Part A, § 1(c), at 7-79.
234. 1988 NBA Agreement, supra note 209, art. VII, Part A, § I(d), at 7-80.
235. Id. art. VII, Part B, at 7-80 to 7-83. Included components are deferred compen-
sation, id. § 1, at 7-80 to 7-81, signing bonuses, id. § 2, at 7-81 to 7-82, loans to players,
id. § 3, at 7-82 to 7-83, and performance bonuses, id. § 4, at 7-83.
236. 1988 NBA Agreement, supra note 209, art. VII, Part D, § l(b), at 7-85.
237. 1995 NBA Outline, supra note 210, at 1.
238. Id. at 1-2; see also 1988 NBA Agreement, supra note 209, art. VII, Part F, at
7-88 to 7-92.
239. 1995 NBA Outline, supra note 210, at 2.
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years.24' The new agreement provides for a phase-in of the three
year rule, so that free agents are now eligible under this exception
after one year with a team, and in 1996-97 after two years.2 4' A
second exception allows a player who has finished a two-year con-
tract to re-sign with his team and increase his compensation by the
greater of 75 percent of his second year salary or the average NBA
player salary.242 The new contract, however, must be for an addi-
tional two years.243 The third exception is the one million dollar
exception, which allows a team to sign one or more players, even
if the team is over the cap, to contracts totaling one million dollars
per year. 244 However, a team may use this exception only three
times during the term of the new agreement.245 A fourth exception
gives a team the ability to sign its first round draft choice for up
to 120 percent of the Rookie Scale amount, even if over the cap.246
The fifth exception or injury exception permits a team to sign a
player for up to 50 percent of the injured player's salary not to
exceed the average players' salary.247 The sixth exception allows
a team to sign a player to a one year contract at the minimum team
salary, even if the team is over the cap and has no other available
exceptions.248 Finally, the seventh exception allows a team to trade
for another player or players, as long as the sum of the players'
contracts being traded is within 15 percent plus $100,000 of each
other.249
C. Comparison of the Agreements
There are significant differences between the provisions of the
1993 NFL Agreement and those described by the 1995 NBA Out-
line. To understand the nature of these differences and the effect
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is important to examine the agreements side-by-side.
1. The College Draft
The NFL's college draft Consists of seven rounds. 50  The
NBA's selection process, however, which consists only of two
rounds, 5' will be reduced in 1998 to one round. 2  Both leagues'
agreements provide for signing procedures and for guidelines
whereby, in the event that a rookie does not sign a contract, he
may not play for the one year period following his draft, if offered
a specified minimum amount.253 Both leagues' uniform players'
contracts provide for certain standard employment terms including,
the length of player service, employment requirements and pay-
254ment.
2. Rookie Salary Limitations
Both agreements restrict movement of rookies by the cap meth-
od without any significant differences in the enforcement provi-
sions under either agreement. 255
3. Free Agency Restrictions
In contrast to the provisions described in the 1995 NBA Out-
line, the 1993 NFL Agreement restricts player mobility through
free agency provisions. An NFL player can only become an unre-
stricted free agent after four years of service to a team.256 In addi-
tion, an NFL player becomes a restricted free agent after three, but
less than four years of service,257 and is subject to the right of first
250. See discussion supra part II.A.1 (discussing NFL draft).
251. See discussion supra part II.B.1 (discussing NBA draft).
252. See discussion supra part I.B.1 (discussing NBA future draft changes).
253. See supra note 171 and accompanying text (discussing the NFL rookie signing
procedures); supra note 214 and accompanying text (discussing the NBA rookie signing
procedures).
254. See supra note 175 and accompanying text (discussing the NFL uniform play-
ers' contract); supra note 218 and accompanying text (discussing the NBA uniform
players' contract).
255. See discussion supra part II.A.2 (discussing NFL rookie salary limitations);
discussion supra part II.B.2 (discussing NBA rookie salary limitations).
256. See supra note 187 and accompanying text (discussing NFL unrestricted free
agency provisions).




refusal,258 which no longer exists in the NBA. 25 9  Finally, in the
NFL a player can be designated as a franchise" or transition
26 1
player; the NBA does not have these types of restrictions.2 62
4. Veteran Salary Limitations
Restrictions concerning players' salaries are also different be-
tween the two leagues. Beginning with the definitions, Defined
Gross. Revenues in the NBA includes many items not included in
the NFL's calculation.263 For example, newly included in the
NBA's definition of Defined Gross Revenues are revenues from
luxury boxes, signage, sponsorships, parking, and concessions.264
Another difference between the two agreements is that the NFL has
no exceptions to its salary cap.265 The NBA's cap has numerous
exceptions that allow a team to exceed the cap, making it a soft
salary cap.
26 6
III. THE OPTIMAL MOBILITY RESTRAINT SYSTEM FOR THE
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUES SHOULD BE BASED
ON THE NBA SOFT SALARY CAP
The above discussion illuminates the differences between the
NBA's and NFL's collective bargaining agreements, regarding
restrictions concerning players' mobility. To understand why play-
ers compete under these restrictions, a comparison to other indus-
tries is instructive.
258. See supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text (discussing the NFL right of
first refusal compensation system).
259. See supra note 230 and accompanying text (discussing the elimination of the
NBA right of first refusal compensation system).
260. See supra notes 195-97 and accompanying text (discussing the NFL franchise
player designation).
261. See supra notes 198-201 and accompanying text (discussing the NFL transition
player designation).
262. See discussion supra part II.B.3 (discussing NBA free agency restrictions).
263. See supra note 203 (discussing NFL Defined Gross Revenues); supra note 233
(discussing NBA Defined Gross Revenues).
264. See supra note 233 and accompanying text (discussing NFL salary cap).
265. See discussion supra part II.A.4 (discussing NBA salary cap).
266. See discussion supra part II.B.4.
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A. Professional Sports As A Unique Industry
By setting maximum player costs, through salary caps, the
sports leagues are price fixing. 267 The most common type of price
fixing occurs when a monopolist 268 charges consumers a price
above the prevailing market price.269 The monopolist can maintain
this artificially inflated price because it is the only producer of the
product. 27° This activity is normally illegal under the antitrust laws
because of its anti-competitive effect on the marketplace. 27' The
reverse situation, however, is true within the sports labor market,
and is also illegal under the antitrust laws.272 This situation, called
a monopsony, occurs when a single purchaser limits purchases in
an effort to reduce costs of a product.273 The sports leagues operate
as monopsonizers when imposing salary restrictions since they are
reducing the costs of player compensation.274 And, absent judicial-
ly created exemptions, 275 the leagues, too, would be subject to sanc-
tions under the antitrust laws.276
267. Price fixing occurs when a business combination is "formed for'the purpose of
and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a
commodity." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1189 (6th ed. 1990) (citing Optivision, Inc. v.
Syracuse Shopping Center Assocs., 472 F. Supp. 665, 676 (N.D.N.Y. 1979)).
268. A monopolist is defined as one who exercises "the exclusive right (or power)
to carry on a particular business or trade, manufacture a particular article, or control the
sale of the whole supply of a particular commodity." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1007 (6th
ed. 1990).
269. See id.; see also Scott J. Foraker, Note, The National Basketball Association
Salary Cap: An Antitrust Violation?, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 157, 171 (1985).
270. Foraker, supra note 269, at 171.
271. Id. at 159. An executive in industry who sought a similar advantage would
expose his firm and possibly himself to civil and criminal penalties by the Unites States
Department of Justice, as well as to private suits by independent competitors. Id. at 179
n.126; see also United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (holding
that price fixing under the Sherman Act is illegal per se).
272. Foraker, supra note 269, at 171.
273. WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 42, at 129; cf. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1007 (6th
ed. 1990) (defining "monopsony").
274. Christopher D. Cameron & J. Michael Echevarria, The Ploys of Summer: Anti-
trust, Industrial Distrust, and the Case Against A Salary Cap For Major League Baseball,
22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 827, 844-45 n.116 (1995).
275. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (discussing Baseball's exemption
under the antitrust laws); note 67 and accompanying text (discussing the non-statutory
exemption from the antitrust laws for collective bargaining agreements).
276. it has been argued that toleration of these monopolistic practices is permitted
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It is the structural nature of the sports industry that requires
tolerance of the leagues' monopsonistic practices. Teams within a
league are not competitors in the true business sense, competing
monetarily against each other. In other industries, with many com-
peting firms, companies generally do not take concerted action
because one firm's profitability depends upon successfully compet-
ing against other firms.277 In professional sports, however, teams
are dependent upon the financial success of other teams for their
own economic success.278  Economic cooperation is the key: the
financial failure of a particular franchise may be detrimental to the
league as a whole. 279  The possibility of the fiscal demise of a
league results from the interdependent nature of team sports, which
demands that teams have quality opponents to play against. 280 It is
this economic necessity of interdependence which requires the use
of labor agreements between players and owners, ensuring the
leagues a steady source of quality labor at a reasonable cost.2
81
In addition to the economic structure rationale for labor cost
restrictions, there are other reasons why players compete under
by the controlling powers of society because these capitalists require outlets for their
surplus capital. Paul Hoch, Rip Off the Big Game: The Exploitation of Sports by the
Power Elite (1972), reprinted in THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS 12, 21 (William P. Lineberry
ed. 1973). Thus, it has been argued, the sports industry provides an illustration of how,
when it suits society's needs, the law is re-interpreted to satisfy a goal. Id.
277. Foraker, supra note 269, at 159.
278. Latimer, supra note 120, at 215-16.
279. Foraker, supra note 269, at 159; see WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 42, at 145.
280. All of the professional leagues operate as joint ventures, defined as "a group
which undertakes an economically productive activity in concert in order to overcome the
impracticability of any one member's amassing sufficient capital for the project or in
order to eliminate the economic waste involved in duplication of effort." Note, Concerted
Refusals to Deal Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1531, 1536 (1958);
see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusive Joint Ventures And Antitrust Policy, 1995 COLUM.
Bus. L. REV. 1-8.
281. National Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684, 689 (2d Cir.), petition for
cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3070 (U.S. July 24, 1995). In addition to the need for standard-
ization in employment terms, uniformity is also required concerning the number of games,
season length, playoff structure, and roster size. Id.; see also Chicago Professional Sports
Ltd. Partnership v. National Basketball Ass'n, 754 F. Supp 1336, 1339 (N.D. Ill. 1991)
("agreements on game rules are essential to producing basketball games at all"), aft'd, 961
F.2d 667 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 409 (1992).
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these systems of restraints. The labor unions are in an inherently
weaker bargaining position than unions in multi-competitor mar-
kets.282 The nature of the sports business requires players' asso-
ciations and league owners to negotiate with each other. Limited
other outlets for professional players' services exists. In other
industries, workers may find other employment in various indus-
tries, thus providing surplus outlets for their services. In profes-
sional sports, however, practically all players possess skills which
are rarely marketable in another industry.283 Thus, players must, to
some extent, take what the owners are giving.
Furthermore, in contrast to industrial workers, professional ath-
letes within the union do not possess homogenous skills. A wide
range of ability exists among players which diversifies players'
associations bargaining directives because of different demands
made by players of varying skill levels.284 For example, average
players benefit from higher minimum salaries and greater job secu-
rity, while superstars under a cap system gain more from free agen-
cy. 285
Additionally, players' associations implicitly realize that a play-
er's value to a team depends not only on that player's ability but
also on the needs of the team.286 The unique fit of player with
team places pressure on teams to search for a winning combination
of attitude, talent, and leadership.287 This creates a lack of job
security that is further magnified by injuries and trades,288 because
282. Lock, supra note 61, at 354.
283. Id. at 356.
284. Id. at 354.
285. Cf. id. While one could argue that it is the owners that are actually at the
mercy of the players because of the difficulty in finding high quality replacements, in
fact, the players are the weaker bargaining unit. While the use of replacement players
may not be an attractive option, it has been used before. In 1987, the NFL used replace-
ment players to break a player's strike, see discussion supra part II.A, and in 1994 Base-
ball had replacement players in training camp and were prepared to use them, but for an
injunction reinstating the expired collective bargaining agreement. See supra note 25 and
accompanying text.
286. Lock, supra note 61, at 354.




when a player no longer satisfies the needs of a team, the player
can be traded.289  This also causes players' associations to speak
with multiple voices. Finally, when compared to other industrial
workers, professional athletes have short careers.29 The short ca-
reer span creates a high turnover in union membership,291 further
weakening the players' bargaining position because demands 'are
always in flux. This results in pressure on the players' associations
to further fracture its' demands.292 All of these factors combine to
result in players accepting mobility restraints.
B. Why Should A System of Player Restraints Include A Salary
Cap?
As noted, the leagues controlled players' salaries through the
use of the reserve clause, right of first refusal, and free agency
restrictions.293 Judicial activism and players' associations' demands
forced the leagues to replace these mobility restrictions with a
subtler type of restriction, the salary cap.294 Whereas the other
289. Id.
290. Id. at 355.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. See discussion supra parts L.A, I.B.
294. Cf. Latimer, supra note 120, at 216. Both Baseball and the NHL proposed a
"salary tax" instead of a salary cap to bolster the sagging finances of lower-revenue
teams. See George Vecsey, Economics 101: Baseball Owner's Egos Would Ease the
Luxury Tax, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1995, at C; NHL Statement, supra note 30; see also
Murray Chass, Face-Off or Batter Up: 2 Sports with Similar Objectives In Mind, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 30, 1994, at BlI; Murray Chass, Baseball Talks Are Back With An Offer By
Owners, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1995, at B17. The tax is appealing because it allows
smaller market teams to receive the tax which is paid on the amount the owner pays
above a specific salary limit. NHL Statement, supra note 30. Sports analysts have
argued that the tax would discourage increased spending by the teams in the larger mar-
kets. See Gary S. Backer, Baseball: How To Level The Playing Field, Bus. WK., Oct.
10, 1994, at 26.
However" a taxation system standing alone is implicitly flawed. Id. There is simply
no incentive for teams with high salaries and in large cities to lower their team compensa-
tion, since these teams would be able to afford the increased salaries and salary tax absent
an equalizing system of revenue sharing. Also, the poorly managed teams with low
salaries in small cities have no incentive to acquire better players and pay them more
because by receiving the tax from the higher paying teams, they could theoretically keep
the additional revenue. Thus, there is continued incentive for these teams to maintain
their place on the welfare side of the equation. Furthermore, based on past spending
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mobility restrictions explicitly bound players to teams, the salary
cap allows limited player mobility. The salary cap only allows
certain teams to negotiate with players-those who have money
available under their salary cap. To determine which teams can
bargain with players, the difference between a team's actual salary
and a team's cap is determined. The remaining balance can then
be used to acquire players. Because some players will not accept
contract offers reduced to the cap limitation, the number of teams
able to bargain with players is reduced. Since the salary cap is a
relatively recent restriction, it must be examined in light of the
league economics which led to its adoption.
Three important themes resonate throughout all leagues' ratio-
nale for imposing or proposing a salary cap.29 First, any modem
system of league economics should define a relationship between
league revenue and players' salaries.296  Second, the system must
treat owners and players fairly.2 97 Finally, all teams must stay
298
competitive.
The economics of professional sports are the confluence of two
factors: sources of revenue and costs of operation.2 99  The main
revenue factors consist of ticket sales, broadcasting fees,300 licens-
patterns, it seems likely that the owners of high salaried teams in larger markets could and
would continue to pay players escalating salaries, thereby consistently maintaining a
competitive edge on teams in smaller markets. See Vecsey, supra.
295. David Zimmerman, Associate General Counsel to the NHL, Address at the




299. St. Louis, supra note 33, at 1246.
300. Id. at 1247. Important factors for a league's success are: quality of play, com-
petitive balance, and reputation for integrity. Roger G. Noll, Professional Basketball:
Economic and Business Perspectives, reprinted in THE BUSINESS OF PROFESSIONAL
SPORTS 18, 30 (Paul D. Staudohar & James A. Mangan eds. 1991). Important factors
contributing to a team's success include absolute and relative quality of play, as well as
the size of the market it plays in. Id. The relative quality of play between teams is
especially important in determining both the success of the team and the league. Id. at
31. Generally, fan interest is determined by two factors: the close competition of play
and the likelihood that the winner will be the team that is favored most by the fans. Id.
Broadcasting fees today are a significant part of league revenue. This, however, was
not always the case, and agreements regarding broadcasting restrictions were not always
viewed with favor. Thane N. Rosenbaum, The Antitrust Implications of Professional
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ing, and sponsorships. Major costs include staff and player sala-
301ries, stadium rental, and travel expenses.
To maximize fan allegiance, financial support, and revenue for
themselves, team owners seek to draft and trade for the best players
to keep games competitive.302 In turn, the owners' competitiveness
for players leads to teams with more discretionary revenue to out-
bid other, small market teams when attempting to sign able play-
ers.
303
The main rationale behind the imposition of both salary caps
was to stop the above process and equalize the field for players.
The leagues believed that salary restrictions were necessary to
ensure that large and small market teams have an equal chance to
Sports Leagues Revisited: Emerging Trends In The Modern Era, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV.
729, 769-70 (1987). In 1953, an NFL By-law was struck down as violating the Sherman
Act because it prevented the broadcasting of a game into a city when that city's team was
on the road, but the game was still being broadcast in the home city. Id. (citing United
States v. National Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953)). In response,
Congress enacted the Sports Broadcasting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994), which removed
these types of rules from the purview of the Sherman Act. Rosenbaum, supra, at 770.
As a result, the leagues were able to sell the broadcasting rights to their games and in
some instances distribute that revenue through revenue sharing. Id.
Each league has its own form of revenue sharing. The NFL system of revenue
sharing provides for the equal split of television monies from contracts with ABC, FOX,
NBC, ESPN and TNT, and income from NFL Properties, Inc. Telephone Interview with
Lal Heneghan, Director of Labor Relations, National Football League (Nov. 16, 1995).
Ticket revenue is split 60/40, with 60 percent going to the home team. Id. The NBA
system of revenue sharing divides proceeds from national television contracts and NBA
Properties revenue equally among all NBA teams. See Chicago, 754 F. Supp. at 1339-42.
However, luxury box revenue, local gate and local television contracts are not equally
shared. Id.
It also is important to note that, even with rules defining what goes into the pool to
be divided, NFL owners, at least, still try to keep more of the pot for themselves. See
Richard Sandomir, Dollars and Dallas: League of Their Own?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24,
1995, sec. 3, at 1; Richard Sandomir, Now Jones Must Prove How Smart Nike Deal Is,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1995, at B23; Richard Sandomir, N.F.L. Properties Sues Cowboys
Over Dealings, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1995, at Bll. In particular, Jerry Jones, owner of
the Dallas Cowboys, has even sued the leagues over the calculation of revenue sharing.
Timothy W. Smith, Cowboy Owner Fires Back With Suit Against N.F.L., N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 7, 1995, at Bll.
301. St. Louis, supra note 33, at 1247.
302. Levine, supra note 133, at 73.
303. Cameron & Echevarria, supra note 274, at 852-53.
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sign players.3° Without these restrictions, proponents of the salary
cap argue, the resulting salary disparities would allow large market
teams to outbid small market teams for the best players, thereby
winning championships year after year.305 Moreover, without the
salary restrictions, the smaller market teams would flounder, lose
fan support, and eventually become bankrupt, 3°6 destroying the
competitive structure of a league.30 7  Therefore, the greater the
equality of the off-the-field competition for players, the higher the
quality of the games, leading to greater overall revenue for the
teams °.30  The increase in revenue results from tighter champion-
ship races and better regular season competition which generates
greater fan interest and financial support.309 This theoretical justifi-
cation is called the competitive balance theory.
In contrast, critics of the salary restraint system and competitive
balance theory argue along two important premises: (1) that the cap
and other restraints are designed to artificially restrict players'
salaries,310 interfering with the unfettered operation of the free mar-
ket; 311 and (2) that the competitive balance theory lacks any empiri-
cal evidence to support its basic tenets.31 2
The critics, however, fail to recognize that in the period before
the institution of the NBA salary cap, it was the large market teams
which consistently made the playoffs. 3  During the ten year period
before the salary cap was imposed, only nine franchises reached the
finals, of which fourteen appearances were made by the Boston
Celtics and Los Angeles Lakers.1 4 Similar evidence is found in
the NFL.315
304. Cf. id.
305. Id. at 853.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Jeffrey A. Rosenthal, The Football Answer to the Baseball Problem: Can Reve-
nue Sharing Work?, 5 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 419, 428 (1995).
309. id.
310. See Foraker, supra note 269, at 172.
311. Id. at 173.
312. Cameron & Echevarria, supra note 274, at 853.
313. See id. at 862.
314. Id.
315. In the seven years directly preceding the NFL cap only four teams won the




Besides the competitive balance rationale, a more compelling
reason for the cap is that the free market for players services exac-
erbated the leagues' fiscal problems. Instrumental in bringing the
NBA to the brink of financial ruin in the late 1970s and early
1980s was the dichotomy between the ability of large market and
small market teams to attract players.316 The losing teams could
not attract talented players because they were perpetual losers, and
as such they could not attract fans.317  Without fans providing a
steady source of revenue, the small market teams were on the verge
of bankruptcy. 31 8 This reasoning was also instrumental in motivat-
ing the NFL to propose its cap.319 With similar problems occurring
within NFL teams, the league proposed strict salary limitations to
ensure the teams would return to profitability.32 °
Thus, it has been argued that the NBA's salary cap was the pri-
mary reason the NBA did not self-destruct. 321 When the cap was
instituted in 1984, the financial outlook of the league suggested the
consolidation of teams, rather than expansion.322 In the ten year
period following the salary cap's institution, however, the NBA
achieved financial stability through its cap system.323
316. Foraker, supra note 269, at 157-58.
317. Id. at 158.
318. Cf. id.
319. Interview with Lal Heneghan, supra note 300. When combined with the num-
ber of teams that were losing money at the time, the outlook for the league was not
promising. Id.; see Antitrust Issues in Relocation of Professional Sports Franchises:
Hearings before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Business Rights, and Competition of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
320. Interview with Lal Heneghan, supra note 300.
321. Levine, supra note 133, at 72-73.
322. Id. at 93; see also National Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, 857 F. Supp. 1069,
1072 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (citing Grantham Trial Decl., July 11, 1994, in 3, 13 (stating that
the salary cap was necessary because "the majority of NBA teams were losing money,
due in part, to rising player salaries and benefits.")), aff'd, 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir.), petition
for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3070 (U.S. July 24, 1995); WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note
42, at 300.
323. Levine, supra note 133, at 72-73. "Although as late as 1985, the league lost
money, every year thereafter the league has shown steadily increasing profits." Steve
Patterson, The National Basketball Association Salary Cap, Dead or Alive?, 19 T. MAR-
SHALL L. REV. 535, 536-37 (1994). "Players [sic] salaries and benefits have decreased
from a pre-cap high of nearly 60% of total revenues to below 50%." Id. To coincide
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One effect of the NBA's cap has been to distribute talent even-
ly throughout the league. 324 By limiting the profitable teams ability
to acquire the twelve most talented players, the league improved
the ability of financially unstable teams to build successful fran-
chises around gifted college athletes. 325 The cap finally allowed
these teams a fair shot at acquiring the more talented players.326
The equal distribution of talent increased the competitiveness of the
exhibitions which, in turn, resulted in increased attendance.327
Teams profited by maintaining and increasing the financial support
of fans. The NFL cap is built upon the same rationale, 32' and is
likely to have similar effects in this area.
A by-product of the increased competitiveness is that network
television now broadcasts NBA games to a larger audience, due to
greater fan interest. 329 When just a few cities had the best players,
only fans in winning cities would tune in. With talent spread even-
ly throughout the NBA, however, games are watched by fans all
over the country.330 Advertisers, sensing the public's support, are
willing to pay more for commercials, and the networks, in turn, are
apt to pay more for the broadcast rights.33' The increases in atten-
dance and television monies have increased the revenues and prof-
itability of the teams.332
Finally, the increased revenue has increased the salary cap be-
with the increased league revenues, the salary cap has grown from $3,600,00 in 1984-85
to $15,175,000 in 1993-94. Id. This increase has greatly benefited the players. Id.
League wide total revenues increased from approximately $150,000,000 in 1984 to over
$800,000,000 in 1992. Id. Broadcasting receipts have reached the $350,000,000 mark
and television ratings have increased 11% during the ten-year period ending in 1993,
while ratings for all other sports have decreased. Id.
324. Levine, supra note 133, at 93.
325. Id. (citing Jane Gross, N.B.A.'s Rebuilding Program Is Showing Results, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 23, 1984, § 5, at 3).
326. Id.
327. Id. at 95.
328. Interview with Lal Heneghan, supra note 300.
329. Levine, supra note 133, at 96.
330. Id.
331. Cf. id.
332. Id. at 96-97. During the 1981-82 season only six teams were able to show a
profit. Id. By 1988, twenty of the twenty-three were profitable. Id.
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cause the cap is based on a percentage of Defined Gross Revenues.
The relational structure of the salary cap, which assures players a
percentage of NBA revenues, permits players to enjoy the increas-
ing revenue with the owners.333 Because the money available to
pay players' salaries increases as the gross revenues of the league
increases, the players have incentive to make the games exciting.
Exciting exhibitions attract more spectators, which generates greater
network interest for larger national television contracts,334 creating
more league revenue and higher salaries.
It is likely that the NFL's hard cap, will be similar, if not great-
er to that of the NBA cap, in terms of its effect on league revenue
and the competitive balance because of the greater restrictiveness
of the cap.
C. The Optimal System of Player Mobility Restraints Is Based
on the NBA Salary Cap
Thus, the case is strong for using a form of the salary cap to
limit player mobility and control costs in competitive sports. The
NFL and NBA have two different systems of restricting players
salaries, each with its merits and faults. The NBA salary cap,
however, provides the best prototype upon which other leagues
should model their restrictions.
The success of the NBA cap method has been in no small part
due to the cap's exceptions. 335 The NBA's cap has kept its players
satisfied by allowing NBA teams to renew players' contracts with-
out regard to salary cap considerations.336 Owners can maintain
their competitive teams by using the veteran player exception.337
This exception allows a team to re-sign its own free agent without
concern for the salary cap.338 Players, confronted with the possibil-
ity that they will have to accept a lower salary when changing
333. Id. at 97.
334. Id. at 76.
335. See supra notes 238-49 and accompanying text (discussing the NBA salary cap
exceptions).
336. Levine, supra note 133, at 94-95.
337. Id. at 95.
338. See discussion supra part II.B.4 (discussing the NBA salary cap).
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teams, can negotiate for their free market salary with their current
team. 339 The incentives of the NBA system is that while players
have full free agency with no compensation given to prior teams,
players have a strong financial incentive to remain with their exist-
340ing team.
In contrast, the NFL's cap, on the other hand, does not share
league revenues with the players in the same manner as the NBA
system.34' Although this cap rises as league revenues increase,
similar to the NBA system, teams are still constrained by the salary
cap when negotiating with their own players. Since free agents are
unable to profit from the direct benefits of the escalating revenue
from television, attendance, licensing, and sponsorships when re-
signing with teams, players must be excised to make room for
other, less expensive players. In one particularly extreme example
of the NFL's cap in operation, New York Giants quarterback Phil
Simms, was cut from the team because his salary formed too large
a percentage under the cap.342 Thus, under the NFL's hard cap
system, some players will not share in steadily increasing league
revenue. 34 3 Additionally, a team's veteran role players and substi-
tutes, still constrained by the exceptionless salary cap, must subor-
dinate their demands to those of the superstar players on the
team. 3 4 With teams awarding their top players multi-million dollar
salaries, low profile players must accept what is offered to them.
Conversely, if a team feels that a superstar is no longer worth his
salary, he is likely to be cut from the team's roster.
Other exceptions to the NBA's cap make it a better system
because it allows teams flexibility when faced with adverse circum-
stances. For example, both the injury and the one million dollar
exceptions allow for contingencies unforeseen during the regular or
off seasons.345 Further, the trade exception346 allows NBA teams
339. Levine, supra note 133, at 95.
340. WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 42, at 301.
341. See discussion supra part Il.A.4 (discussing the NFL salary cap).
342. See Mike Freeman, It's 15 Years Down And So Long: A Stunned Simms Is Cut,
N.Y. TIME , June 16, 1994, § B, at 5.
343. See Bernard Pellegrino & Seth Josephson, Recent Case, 4 SETON HALL J. SPORT
L. 1, 24 (1994).
344. Id.
345. See supra notes 244, 247 and accompanying text (discussing the one million
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the ability to structure themselves so as to assemble a winning
combination of talent, thereby making games exciting. No longer
do teams have to renegotiate contracts for players on their teams
to acquire talented players. The NFL has no such exception, 347 and
therefore must renegotiate contracts with existing players or excise
them in order to acquire new players.
One former flaw of the NBA's cap system was that it contained
loopholes whereby teams could devise methods to circumvent the
salary cap in spite of the many exceptions. In one recent example,
a federal district court affirmed a Special Master's decision that al-
lowed owners to circumvent cap restrictions by allowing them to
negotiate contracts with early termination clauses.348 As discussed
above,3 49 the general manager of the Portland Trailblazers suggested
an option-out clause to sign Chris Dudley.35 0 The early termination
clause operated so, that Dudley could opt-out of the remainder of
the contract after his first year to become a -Trailblazer free
agent 1.35  The team could then re-sign him to a contract equal to his
fair market value without being restrained by the salary cap.35 2
These provisions posed a threat to the cap's effectiveness of con-
trolling the league's labor costs. 353 The new NBA agreement, how-
ever, seems to have eliminated this problem through the veteran
player exception. 4 This exception requires a player to be on the
roster of a team for at least three years before negotiating as a
team's free agent. 355  This is significant because it resolves the
interpretation problems which ensures the owners comply with the
cap, at least until new methods of circumvention arise.
dollar and injury exceptions to the NBA salary cap).
346. See supra note 249 and accompanying text (discussing the trade exception to
the NBA salary cap).
347. See discussion supra part II.A.4 (discussing the NFL salary cap).
348. Bridgeman v. National Basketball Ass'n, 838 F. Supp. 172 (D.N.J. 1993).
349. See discussion supra part I.B (discussing the collective bargaining history
between the NBA and NBPA).
350. Bridgeman, 838 F. Supp. at 175.
351. Id.
352. Seth Josephson, Recent Case, 4 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 732 (1994).
353. Latimer, supra note 120, at 238-40.
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Similar problems have arisen under the NFL salary cap system.
Although there are no exceptions to the NFL's cap, two instances
have indicated that the NBA methods of cap circumvention will be
revisited in the NFL.356 The first instance involved the San Fran-
cisco 49ers ("49ers").357 In 1994, the first year of the salary cap,
the 49ers seemingly retarded the apparent purpose of the salary
cap-to evenly distribute talent throughout the league.358 The 49ers
entered into agreements whereby most of their free agent players
would be given low base salaries plus bonus incentives if the team
made the playoffs and the Super Bowl.359 These incentive clauses,
when coupled with below market salaries, seem to violate the spir-
it, if not the letter, of the NFL's hard cap system 360 because it al-
lows owners in large market cities, in effect, to buy quality players
in apparent disregard of the intended purpose of the salary cap.
A second example of alleged cap circumvention under the hard
cap system is the signing of Deion Sanders by the Dallas Cow-
boys.36' Jerry Jones, the owner of the Dallas Cowboys, outbid the
49ers by offering Sanders a deal valued at over $35 million for
seven years including a $13 million signing bonus. 362 Under league
rules,363 the Cowboys are allowed to apply $1.8 million of the bo-
nus toward the calculation of their salary cap for each of the con-
tract's seven years.36 Sanders will receive only $178,000 in the
first year of his contract, but his salary will steadily increase to $5
million in the last year of his contract, when the salary limit pre-
Sumably will be higher.365 The NFL immediately criticized the deal
356. The NFL and NFLPA are currently devising methods to correct this problem
and the one regarding the Entering Player Pool discussed infra notes 387-91. NFL on
NBC: Free Agency: Will the Game Survive?, (NBC television broadcast, Dec. 10, 1995).
357. Timothy W. Smith, Free Agency Appears to Be a Big Problem for Some Teams
and a Panacea for Others, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1995, § 8, at 1.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. See discussion supra part II.A.4 (discussing the NFL salary cap).
361. Smith, supra note 41.
362. Allen R. Myerson, Jerry Jones Has An Ally In Fight Against the N.F.L., N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 13, 1995, at B12.
363. 1993 NFL Agreement, supra note 209, art. XXIV, § 7(b), at 81.
364. Myerson, supra note 362.
365. Id. The amount of the cap increases as Defined Gross Revenues increases, thus
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because of its low base salary and large bonus as a method of cap
circumvention.366 To date, however, the NFL has not ruled on the
propriety of Sanders' contract. This is an area that will prevent the
NFL system from achieving is intended effect, if action is not taken
by the league.
Another aspect that weighs in favor of the NBA cap is the
method calculating Defined Gross Revenues. Responding to the
increased demand for the league's trademarks, the NBA formed
NBA Properties, Inc.367 This division owns the rights to market the
images of the players and the team's logos worldwide.368 Today,
this subsidiary has revenues of over $1 billion.369 This amount was
not included in the 1988 NBA Agreement's definition of Defined
Gross Revenues when calculating the salary cap. 370 The 1995 NBA
Outline, however, states that licensing, luxury box revenue, and
signage, among other things, will now be included in the calcula-
tion of Defined Gross Revenues. 371 The NFL in its calculation of
Defined Gross Revenues, on the other hand, does not include any
of these items.372 The NFL includes this money, with the exception
of luxury box revenues, however, in calculating revenue sharing.373
Therefore, NFL players do not share in this money because players
only receive amounts, for salary cap purposes, included in Defined
Gross Revenues.374
Arguably, one of the NFL's cap merits, as compared to the
NBA which has relatively fewer players and requires smaller facili-
Sanders' higher salary will constitute a smaller percentage of the cap than it would today.
366. Id.





371. See supra note 233 and accompanying text (defining NBA Defined Gross
Revenue).
372. See supra note 203 and accompanying text (defining NFL Defined Gross Reve-
nue).
373. Interview with Lal Heneghan, supra note 300; see also supra note 300 (discuss-
ing NFL revenue sharing).
374. See supra note 233 (discussing NFL Defined Gross Revenues).
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ties to exhibit games,3 is that its cost structure is significantly
different.376 An NFL exhibition requires more players, larger play-
ing fields, and more equipment,377 making costs more prohibitive
than basketball.378 One rationale for the NFL when implementing
its hard cap was the indirect concern of the number of players on
the roster and the higher costs associated with such a large team. 3 79
The NFL chose a hard cap, as opposed to the NBA cap, because
the league felt that a governor on compensation was not enough to
control costs for the league. 380 The league, however, did allow for
some flexibility regarding signing bonuses 381 and incentives.382
While this rationale seems clear, further analysis of the NFL's
economic structure reveals the flaws. NFL teams do not start on
equal revenue footing. Luxury box revenues make up a significant
amount of revenues and for the basis of large disparities in discre-
tionary revenue for teams.383 With the system of NFL revenue
sharing, this income is not shared, so in order to place owners on
equal footing the league had to place a strict upper limit on sala-
ries, 384 since the owners wanted to keep the extra money. Similarly
in the NBA while all revenue is not equally shared between the
owners,385 players are still able to reap the benefits of the larger
revenue pie because all league revenues are included in Defined
Gross Revenues.386 Since all amounts are included in Defined
Gross Revenues, owners have incentive to actively market their




379. Interview With Lal Heneghan, supra note 300.
380. Id.
381. 1993 NFL Agreement, supra note 165, art. XXIV, § 7(b), at 81. Signing
bonuses are pro rated over the term of the contract. Id.
382. Id. § 7(c), at 83. Incentives are included in the calculation of the salary cap if
they are likely to be earned that year. Id.
383. Interview with Lal Heneghan, supra note 300. Further, with the new deals that
Jerry Jones has made, the best marketed team in the NFL can now become richer. See
supra note 41 (discussing Jones' new player contracts).
384. Interview with Lal Heneghan, supra note 300.
385. See supra note 300 (discussing NBA revenue sharing procedures).
386. See supra note 233 (defining NBA Defined Gross Revenues).
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teams to further increase the revenue pie, which in turn would
increase players' compensation. With a more equal distribution of
revenue between the owners and players, the hard cap becomes
unnecessary.
Additionally, although the hard cap was supposed to restrain
salaries and promote the competitive balance, neither effect has yet
come to fruition. Since teams can keep the extra luxury box reve-
nue, they still try to circumvent the cap through the incentive and
signing bonus provisions. Additionally, in the NFL the lack of
exceptions has resulted in NFL owners seeking to escape the re-
strictiveness of their own cap. For example, the signing of Deion
Sanders' by the Dallas Cowboys demonstrates an obvious willing-
ness to disregard the hard cap in order to obtain talented players.
Furthermore, even with agreement about the need for rookie
salary restrictions,387 NFL owners have attempted to circumvent the
cap regarding rookie salary amounts.3"8 This new generation of cap
circumvention is effectuated by including performance standards
clauses in some of the rookies' contracts. 389 These clauses provide
that a player can become a free agent, upon meeting certain perfor-
mance goals.3" For example, if a player makes a certain number
of tackles or plays in a specified number of games, over a specified
period, the player would automatically become a free agent.39'
A final criticism of the entire NFL restraint system is that the
NFL, unlike the NBA, continues to impose free agency restric-
tions.392 These provisions are overly restrictive in a system that has
a hard cap, because player mobility is sufficiently constrained by
387. See discussion supra parts II.A.2, II.B.2 (discussing the NFL and NBA rookie
salary limits). With league owners realizing that able college players could attract fans,
and thus, increase revenue, the owners bid up salaries for them. However, these rookie
salary increases affected the ability of veteran players to receive salary increases under
the cap system. Therefore, both leagues and players' associations agreed to rookie salary
caps as a means of stabilizing the salaries of unproven rookies.
388. Pellegrino & Josephson, supra note 343, at 17-22.
389. Id. at 17-18.
390. Id.
391. Id. at 18.
392. See discussion supra part II.A.3 (discussing NFL free agency restrictions,
franchise, and transition players).
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this cap since teams must fit all 45 players under the cap.393
To complete the system of restrictions and ensure players re-
ceive adequate salaries while owners control costs, the college draft
must remain in effect as well as rookie salary caps. The college
draft is especially important for league sports because of the com-
petitive balance necessary for meaningful sports competition.394
The primary rationale for the draft is to promote competition be-
tween the teams, and that by allowing the teams that finish last to
select first, the games become more competitive.395 Thus, with
better contests, fan interest increases due to tighter championship
races.396 The draft further assists teams who have not been able to
select the "right" players, have made inequitable trades, or suffered
a losing season because of player injuries to acquire new, quality
talent. Free agency becomes unimportant under an NBA salary cap
system because of the exceptions to the salary cap which enable a
player to sign or re-sign, depending what he thinks his market
value is. The right of first refusal also becomes irrelevant because
a team can always offer more to its existing player, since it will not
be restrained by the salary cap. The rookie caps are necessary to
ensure that rookies prove themselves before squeezing out more
experienced veteran players from their fair share under the cap.
CONCLUSION
To ensure the long-term profitability of sports enterprises and
provide an arena for athletes to continue showcasing their abilities,
escalating costs must be controlled.397 Salary escalation can be
effectively contained mainly through the salary cap. While early
forms of the mobility restrictions reduced athletes' station to just
above involuntary servitude, today's NBA salary cap and greater
393. However, in light of the NFL cap circumvention methods, these restrictions may
become more important unless the league addresses the issue.




397. Latimer, supra note 120, at 241-42.
[Vol. 6:243
19951 SALARY CAPS 299
system of restraints allows players to share increasing league reve-
nue with the ability to shop their services for suitable employment
opportunities.
The optimal scenario for all leagues is to operate under an
NBA-,like system. A salary cap with specific exceptions and limit-
ed additional mobility restraints would serve to eliminate the bick-
ering over the revenue pie and player mobility. Owners would be
able to plan and control escalating costs, and players would either
gain mobility, or with the utilization of available exceptions, in-
crease their compensation. Most importantly, players would be
able to return to exhibiting their skills to the fans. Once this bal-
ance over revenue and freedom is reached, fans could re-focus their
attention from the negotiating sessions to the fields of competition.
I
